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<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/utility/FeedStylesheets/atom.xsl" media="screen"?><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en"><title type="html">Parliament &amp;amp; Government</title><subtitle type="html" /><id>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/atom.aspx</id><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/default.aspx" /><link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/atom.aspx" /><generator uri="http://communityserver.org" version="3.0.20611.960">Community Server</generator><updated>2008-03-24T12:33:00Z</updated><entry><title>Your Parliament - 1964 edition</title><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/11/06/your-parliament-1964-edition.aspx" /><id>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/11/06/your-parliament-1964-edition.aspx</id><published>2008-11-06T17:33:00Z</published><updated>2008-11-06T17:33:00Z</updated><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/photos/sample/images/original/Your-Parliament-1964.aspx" title="Your Parliament 1964" alt="Your Parliament 1964" align="left" height="131" width="200" /&gt;The Hansard Society was established in 1944 to promote the ideals of the parliamentary system of government and to ensure that democracy would be safeguarded by being understood, debated and improved by parliamentarians and the public.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Part of our work to increase the public’s understanding of politics has been to produce accessible information on the workings of the political system in the United Kingdom. We recently came across what was probably our first effort in this area – a beautifully illustrated booklet entitled &lt;i&gt;Your Parliament&lt;/i&gt;, that the Society initially published in 1951. The version we unearthed is a revised edition published in 1964.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In 2004 the Hansard Society produced another publication called &lt;i&gt;Your Parliament&lt;/i&gt; when we identified that there was no comparable literature explaining the basics of the political system. Whether the title was inspired by the previous version – if indeed staff were aware of its existence at the time – is unknown. In 2008 an updated &lt;i&gt;Your Parliament&lt;/i&gt; was produced for our website.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;For historical interest and comparison we have scanned the old &lt;i&gt;Your Parliament&lt;/i&gt; and you can &lt;a href="http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/files/folders/1529/download.aspx" title="Your Parliament 1964"&gt;download a copy here&lt;/a&gt;. The current &lt;i&gt;Your Parliament&lt;/i&gt; is &lt;a href="http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/07/24/Your-Parliament_3A00_-Make-it-work-for-you.aspx" title="Your Parliament 2008"&gt;available here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/aggbug.aspx?PostID=1527" width="1" height="1"&gt;</content><author><name>admin</name><uri>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/members/admin.aspx</uri></author><category term="PROGHOME" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGHOME/default.aspx" /><category term="PROGNEWS" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGNEWS/default.aspx" /></entry><entry><title>Law in the Making receives an honourable mention at Think Tank of the Year awards</title><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/10/20/law-in-the-making-receives-an-honourable-mention-at-think-tank-of-the-year-awards.aspx" /><id>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/10/20/law-in-the-making-receives-an-honourable-mention-at-think-tank-of-the-year-awards.aspx</id><published>2008-10-20T15:23:00Z</published><updated>2008-10-20T15:23:00Z</updated><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/photos/sample/images/1300/original.aspx" width="80" align="left" border="0" height="121" alt="" /&gt;The Hansard Society&amp;#39;s recent publication, &lt;a href="http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/07/11/law-in-the-making-a-new-publication-by-the-hansard-society.aspx" title="Law in the Making" target="_blank"&gt;Law in the Making: Influence and Change in the Legislative Process&lt;/a&gt;, received an honourable mention at Prospect magazine&amp;#39;s annual &lt;a href="http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=10408" target="_blank" title="Think Tank of the Year awards"&gt;Think Tank of the Year awards&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;To purchase a copy of the book, &lt;a href="http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/publications/archive/2008/07/17/new-research-on-influencing-legislation-launched.aspx" title="Order Law in the Making" target="_blank"&gt;click here&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/aggbug.aspx?PostID=1501" width="1" height="1"&gt;</content><author><name>admin</name><uri>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/members/admin.aspx</uri></author><category term="PROGHOME" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGHOME/default.aspx" /><category term="PROGNEWS" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGNEWS/default.aspx" /></entry><entry><title>Rubber Stamp or Cockpit? The Impact of Parliament on Government Legislation  </title><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/10/20/rubber-stamp-or-cockpit-the-impact-of-parliament-on-government-legislation.aspx" /><id>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/10/20/rubber-stamp-or-cockpit-the-impact-of-parliament-on-government-legislation.aspx</id><published>2008-10-20T13:58:00Z</published><updated>2008-10-20T13:58:00Z</updated><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;img src="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/photos/sample/images/186/original.aspx" align="left" border="0" alt="" /&gt;Susanna Kalitowski&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Research Fellow, Parliament &amp;amp; Government Programme, Hansard Society&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;The following article, which is derived from the Hansard Society&amp;#39;s &lt;a href="http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/07/11/law-in-the-making-a-new-publication-by-the-hansard-society.aspx" target="_blank" title="Law in the Making"&gt;Law in the Making&lt;/a&gt; publication, was published in the October 2008 issue of &lt;a href="http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/" title="Parliamentary Affairs" target="_blank"&gt;Parliamentary Affairs&lt;/a&gt;. It can also be accessed &lt;a href="http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/current.dtl#ARTICLES" target="_blank" title="Parliamentary Affairs link"&gt;online&lt;/a&gt;.&amp;nbsp;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;ABSTRACT&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Arguably the Westminster Parliament&amp;#39;s prime function-and its best known-is to make law. More accurately, it is to scrutinise and approve bills put forward by the government, which is almost always able to command a majority in the House Commons. Taken together with the conventional dominance of the Commons over the House of Lords, Parliament usually passes the government&amp;#39;s legislation. To some, this relationship is the inevitable and correct method by which the government exercises its mandate; to others it is indicative that Parliament is simply a rubber stamp, a mechanism without clout or meaning. But even if Parliament usually enacts the government&amp;#39;s bills, to what extent does it have an impact on their content? While a great deal of public attention is regularly given to the operation and effect of individual laws, there is less understanding of the detailed process by which policy ideas evolve into legislation.

&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;INTRODUCTION&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In an effort to fill this gap, the Hansard Society has undertaken a study on the elements that come together in making an act of Parliament.1

 We ignored Bismarck&amp;#39;s advice that ‘laws are like sausages: it is better not to see them being made&amp;#39; and studied how five recent pieces of primary legislation came to take the form they did and who or what influenced their final outcome, tracking them at various stages during the legislative process, including the consultation stages, prelegislative scrutiny (if undertaken) and the parliamentary stages in the Commons and the Lords.2 The research draws upon over 80 interviews with ministers, MPs, peers, government and parliamentary officials, party political staff, journalists and pressure groups. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Although the study examined the wide range of influence on legislation-from civil servants to pressure groups-it was particularly concerned with discerning the impact of Parliament.3 There is a tendency to judge the relationship between Parliament and government in terms of clear-cut rebel victory and Cabinet defeat, of dominance and submission. However, such a perspective reveals only a certain amount about the relationship between Parliament and government; there are many other, more subtle approaches to understanding how legislation is shaped.

&lt;sup&gt; &lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This article examines some of the findings from the study&amp;#39;s five case studies: the Export Control Act 2002, Equality Act 2006, the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 and the Welfare Reform Act 2007. As there is not sufficient space here to tell the whole story of each Act, the focus is on Parliament&amp;#39;s impact on legislation and the role of MPs and peers in the legislative process.4 It is clear from the research that parliamentary scrutiny does make a difference: legislative proposals do change measurably as they make their way through Parliament. While on most occasions the broad thrust of government proposals finds its way into law, the assertion that the executive is so dominant that it is able to discount the views of Parliament is not borne out by close analysis.
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;EXPORT CONTROL ACT 2002&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;The Export Control Act tells us that in principle, more pre-legislative scrutiny is a good idea -Roger Berry MP 5&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The long-awaited legislative response to the 1996 Scott Report on the arms to Iraq scandal, the Export Control Bill introduced a new regime for regulating the government&amp;#39;s licensing of arms exports. Although it enjoyed cross-party support, the Bill emerged from the Lords with two significant government defeats on sustainable development and academic freedom, which were however overturned in the Commons. The government was forced to negotiate over the latter, although it only did so at the last possible moment, after it was clear that it would be beaten in the Lords a second time if it did not compromise. The legislature&amp;#39;s examination of the Bill was notable for the extensive prelegislative scrutiny by parliamentary committees; the high degree of backbench Labour dissent in both Houses; and two significant amendments in the Lords.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;PRE-LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY BY PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES. The Act was the product of five years of consultation and 11 months of parliamentary scrutiny, and was subject to a higher than average degree of pre-legislative scrutiny by parliamentary committees. The House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee scrutinised the white paper preceding the Bill.6 The establishment of the Quadripartite Committee (the ‘Quad&amp;#39;)-composed of members from four Commons select committees7-allowed for a comprehensive scrutiny of the draft bill.8 The Chair, Roger Berry MP, asserted that its prodding was partly responsible for the publication of a draft bill. The House of Lords Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee also had an influence: the power to require companies to provide information on arms exports was dropped following its recommendation.9

&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;GOVERNMENT BACKBENCH DISSENT. A number of Labour backbenchers in both Houses were openly critical of specific aspects of the Bill, namely those concerning parliamentary scrutiny, sustainable development and extraterritoriality. They often led debate and tabled amendments, although there were few divisions and rebellions. During standing committee, Malcolm Savidge MP tabled amendments on parliamentary scrutiny, sustainable development and extraterritorial controls that were supported by his colleague Vera Baird MP. At report stage, Tony Worthington MP and Martin O&amp;#39;Neill MP tabled amendments on sustainable development and prior parliamentary scrutiny which were supported by numerous colleagues. Many Labour MPs signed Early Day Motions (EDMs) tabled by their colleagues at various stages of the process.10&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Backbench Labour dissent similarly emerged in the Lords over the issues of prior parliamentary scrutiny, the lack of full extraterritoriality and sustainable development, though very few government backbenchers voted in favour of the successful Liberal Democrat amendment on the latter. Moreover, the issue which prompted the most radical change to the face of the Bill-academic freedom-did not mobilise government backbenchers. In fact, on the areas of concern to Labour parliamentarians, there was either no change (extraterritoriality) or fairly little (sustainable development). However, with regards to the latter, it is likely that there would have been less movement in the Lords if government backbenchers in both the Commons and the Lords had not kicked up a fuss.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;DEFEATS IN THE LORDS BY THE OPPOSITION. It was the unity of the opposition parties in the Lords-a cross-party coalition of Liberal Democrats, Conservatives and crossbenchers-that led to the government&amp;#39;s double defeat at report stage on sustainable development and academic freedom. The former was effectively quashed in the Commons after the withdrawal of Conservative support and very few Labour rebellions, despite the concern voiced by backbenchers. However, the latter resulted in a substantive change to the Bill-the addition of a new clause protecting some types of scientific research and public information from export controls-largely due to the refusal of the opposition parties in the Lords to back down.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;ASSESSMENT. A senior parliamentary official asserted that the Export Control Act is representative of the ‘higher end of the legislative process&amp;#39;.11 Unlike many bills, it was subject to a considerable degree of consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny which, for the most part, improved the legislation, albeit not dramatically. As Roger Berry said of the Bill at second reading, ‘it is a great improvement on the white

paper and it gets better with each drafting&amp;#39;.12 Parliamentarians recalled that the level of parliamentary debate on the Bill had been higher than average. Backbenchers from the governing party, who often remain silent, contributed to-and sometimes even led-debate at all stages of the process, even on standing committees. Nonetheless, only a few changes were made to the Bill during the parliamentary passage.

&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;b&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;EQUALITY ACT 2006&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;i&gt;The Equality Act shows that if enough parliamentarians have grievances and concerns, it can be remedied -Alan Wardle, Stonewall 13&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Equality Act 2006 reformed the institutional framework that accompanies equality and human rights legislation in the UK and introduced changes to discrimination law. It had been envisaged as a response to changes in European law. However, the combination of an active lobby of interests, supporters in government and pressures from Parliament meant that a broader piece of legislation was added to the statute book. As John Bercow MP said, ‘the Act as a whole is a considerable tribute to government consultation and parliamentary scrutiny&amp;#39;.14&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;CONSULTATION STAGES. The Act was preceded by years of consultation which encompassed green and white papers and the establishment of a stakeholder task force. Consultation resulted in clear changes to policy when the Equality Bill was finally published, including two entirely new protections against discrimination-for religion or belief in the provision of goods, facilities and services and the duty on public authorities to promote gender equality (the ‘gender duty&amp;#39;). &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Parliamentarians were generally unaware of the extent of consultation that had taken place between the government and external actors before the Bill was introduced. They were not party to the advisory groups and did not contribute to the official consultative process. Nevertheless, a few did have some influence even at this stage. For example, Angela Eagle MP kept equality issues on the internal Labour party radar in the run-up to the 2004 Warwick Agreement between Labour and the trade unions. She also pushed for the ‘gender duty&amp;#39;, introducing a 10-minute rule bill in 2004.15 Similarly, Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC pushed for the harmonisation of discrimination legislation, introducing into Parliament his own Equality Bill in 2003. He was later to play an important role in the passage of the government&amp;#39;s bill.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY. Parliamentarians from all sides came to the fore during the passage of the Bill, which was first introduced in the House of Lords. As it was not a party political bill, the government showed a willingness to listen to the opposition. Ministers spent time meeting privately with parliamentarians and, in many cases, responded to their concerns. As the minister in the Lords, Baroness Ashton of Upholland, explained during third reading: ‘Throughout the passage of this Bill, I have met with every noble Lord who has put down an amendment in order to make sure that we have the right kind of dialogue.&amp;#39;16&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Perhaps due to this consensual approach, the legislation was not subject to many votes: only two took place on amendments. While the government did not relent in all instances, it did make a large number of concessionary amendments. The inclusion of provision for sexual orientation regulations and the removal of the religion and belief harassment clauses were two of the most important amendments to be made to the Bill; the former with the (somewhat reluctant) consent of the government, while the latter was won on a vote. The extent of change in the Lords meant that the decision to first introduce the Bill into the second chamber, which was a consequence of timetabling concerns within the Department of Trade and Industry, was instrumental. The Lords was able to take control of the shape of the Bill.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Both parliamentarians and external actors saw the high degree of cooperation between frontbenchers and backbenchers across all the political parties as strengthening the quality of scrutiny. For example, Conservative MP John Bercow told the Commons at third reading that, ‘the Bill was good before and, as a result of amendments in the course of legislative scrutiny, it is better now.&amp;#39;17 Similarly, Sam Smethers of the Equal Opportunities Commission commented that, ‘certainly in the Lords, it was very detailed scrutiny; it felt to me as if it was in safe hands&amp;#39;.18 A high level of ministerial involvement underpinned the effectiveness of the parliamentary process and was praised by parliamentarians such as Lord Lester. Referring to Baroness Ashton, he said: ‘She quickly made me into an ally, even though I am a Liberal Democrat. On most of the major issues, we worked together. If someone else was on this Bill, we wouldn&amp;#39;t have been able to achieve what we did.&amp;#39;19&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;ASSESSMENT. According to the equality minister, Meg Munn, the Act ‘ultimately turned into something which it hadn&amp;#39;t started out to be&amp;#39;.20 The government had planned a straightforward bill to set up a merged and enlarged new body, but the ‘process incurred significant difficulties&amp;#39;. The outcome was an Act that added to the incremental and piecemeal nature of existing equality legislation, despite the government&amp;#39;s avowed aim of moving on from that model. Like the other bills considered in this study, varying narratives have emerged as to how change came about. What is clear, however, is that a range of external actors and parliamentarians played a significant role in shaping the substance of the legislation. &lt;b&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;IMMIGRATION, ASYLUM AND NATIONALITY ACT 2006&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;i&gt;Even though you&amp;#39;re utterly pooh-poohed in the Commons, once a bill goes to the House of Lords, Conservative colleagues in the Lords can pick up some of our points -Humfrey Malins MP 21&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill sought to limit appeal rights for people refused entry to the UK and introduced fines for hiring illegal immigrants, among other measures. After the London bombings of 7 July 2005 two days after the Bill&amp;#39;s second reading, it also sought to make it easier to strip suspected terrorists of UK citizenship, deny them asylum, and speed up their deportation. It was clear from the start that there was relatively little room for manoeuvre: the government made cursory attempts to consult others before the Bill was published. Campaigners told us civil servants had indicated that No. 10 had issued a strict order to get to grips with the ‘immigration problem&amp;#39; as it was an ‘electoral liability&amp;#39;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;MPs and peers involved with the Act felt that they had little influence over its content. However, a closer look at the parliamentary proceedings reveals that when the two opposition parties worked together, particularly with Labour backbenchers, the government was far more likely to make amendments or grant concessions. Moreover, while nearly all the significant changes were made in the Lords, often the idea had first been mooted in the Commons. In addition, if the minister was personally receptive to a change, it was more likely to be made.

&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;HOUSE OF COMMONS. Very few changes to the Bill were made in the Commons. However, MPs spent the majority of their time debating the removal of appeal rights, which ultimately was amended in the Lords. The Commons had less time to discuss other key measures in the Bill, notably the counter-terrorism clauses introduced at the start of standing committee.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Conservatives and Liberal Democrats were united throughout the committee, supporting each other&amp;#39;s amendments on nearly every occasion; none were accepted. Neil Gerrard MP was the only backbench Labour MP to consistently speak and table amendments. Although he had agreed not to vote against the government in order to be a committee member, he helped get the issues of unaccompanied children, vouchers for failed asylum seekers, and Section 9 of the 2004 Act22 on to the agenda, which later resulted in changes in the Lords. At the end of committee, the proceedings were praised by the minister and the chair, who described them as ‘an example of Parliament working at its best&amp;#39;.23 Opposition MPs however did not share this view. Conservative MP Humfrey Malins felt he had ‘no influence whatsoever&amp;#39; as ‘the government were completely unwilling to listen to any amendments&amp;#39;. His colleague, Cheryl Gillan MP, also believed that the government was not willing to accept any suggestion or amendment, or even fully debate it.24 The Liberal Democrat Evan Harris MP also judged it to be a ‘worse than usual standing committee experience&amp;#39;.25 &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;At report stage, the government finally introduced an amendment in response to a serious concern raised in committee that ensured that people who do not receive leave to remain did not automatically become overstayers. It also accepted a Conservative amendment to increase the deadline for the payment of fines from 14 to 28 days.

&amp;nbsp;

&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;HOUSE OF LORDS. Only a small number of peers participated in debates although the Bill was covered more thoroughly in the Lords than the Commons, particularly the counter-terrorism clauses. Moreover, all of the most significant changes were made there. Parliamentarians and pressure groups alike indicated that the government minister in the Lords, Baroness Ashton of Upholland, was more amenable to changing the Bill than her counterpart in the Commons. They highlighted her approachability and preference for coming to a compromise behind the scenes; there was only one division during the Lords stages and no government defeats.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;From the beginning, Baroness Ashton emphasised that she was open to alternative ways to ‘streamline&amp;#39; variation appeals to the formulation found in the Bill. At report stage she came back with a set of amendments which preserved in-country variation appeals. A government amendment at report stage gave the home secretary the power to offer assistance to failed asylum seekers, another attempt to placate concerns raised in the Lords. Two minor opposition amendments were also accepted by the government: a Liberal Democrat amendment giving the home secretary the power to repeal Section 9 of the 2004 Act and a Conservative amendment requiring the home secretary to submit a report to Parliament on the removal of entry clearance appeals. Baroness Ashton&amp;#39;s background in children&amp;#39;s issues led her to intervene to ensure children under 10 would not be subject to a good character test.&amp;nbsp;

&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;ASSESSMENT. The Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act which emerged from Parliament was noticeably different from the Bill published nine months earlier. The Act&amp;#39;s first clause was substantially revised at the start of Lords report stage in the wake of Conservative and Liberal Democrat opposition; the effect was to preserve in-country variation appeals. A number of more minor amendments and assurances were also made. However, on the major issues in the Bill that were not opposed by the Conservatives in the Lords-notably the removal of entry clearance appeals and the counter-terrorism measures-there was little or no change.

&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY REFORM ACT 2006&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;The Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill was an example of Parliament putting the brakes on massively. The Bill was so stupid that even Parliament noticed -parliamentary official 26&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill was introduced as part of the government&amp;#39;s drive to reduce regulation and conceived as a revision to the Regulatory Reform Act 2001. However, it soon became clear that the Bill had important constitutional implications and it was rapidly nicknamed the ‘Abolition of Parliament Bill&amp;#39; due to the unprecedented power it offered to the executive. The legislation provides a stark example of how solid scrutiny and strong opposition in Parliament can force the government to back down. A member of the government acknowledged that the work of parliamentarians in clearly identifying the Bill&amp;#39;s shortcomings led the executive to introduce unanticipated changes. This view was echoed by an official, who told us that the pressure from Parliament alone was enough to force ministers into changes, notwithstanding the immense pressure exerted by the media and campaign groups.27&amp;nbsp;

&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;INTERVENTIONS BY SELECT COMMITTEES. Many interviewees asserted that the lack of thorough pre-legislative scrutiny was a particular problem, as the consultation prior to the Bill&amp;#39;s introduction achieved little beyond providing supportive quotes from business. The marked difference between the Cabinet Office consultation document28 and the Bill presented to Parliament rendered the consultation little more than a publicity exercise.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;However, the work of several select committees examining the Bill proved to be of particular value and largely made up for the absence of formal pre-legislative scrutiny. Over the course of its passage through Parliament, the concerns raised and recommendations made by the Commons Regulatory Reform Committee, the Commons Procedure Committee and the Lords Constitution Committee were eventually reflected in changes, although the length of time it took for the government to accept these recommendations was widely criticised.29&amp;nbsp;

&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;HOUSE OF COMMONS. It was during standing committee stage in the Commons that many of the key arguments later picked up in the process were actually first made. The Conservative and Liberal Democrat frontbenches had discussions throughout the passage of the Bill and were aware of the arguments each intended to make. Conservative spokesperson Oliver Heald MP said: ‘The role of

opposition spokespeople is to wave the flag of danger and on this occasion I think both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats did a good job.&amp;#39; There was praise too for Liberal Democrat MP David Howarth, who made the House Magazine&amp;#39;s ‘Backbencher of the Year&amp;#39; shortlist for his efforts.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The shift in the government&amp;#39;s position on the Bill can be pinpointed to a letter from the Lords chief whip to the prime minister and cabinet between standing committee and report stage which argued for changes in order to make it more palatable to his fellow members- many of which mirrored opposition amendments.30 The letter was leaked to the press a few days later.31 Realising it faced defeat at report stage-and was certain to have the Bill re-written in the Lords-the government concluded it should take pre-emptive action. Substantial alterations (five new clauses and 74 amendments) were consequently tabled between the committee and report stages.32 A warm reception was given to the amendments at report stage. However, MPs argued the process had been flawed and that there were further matters that still required remedy. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;ASSESSMENT. The Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 was an object demonstration of robust parliamentary scrutiny. This view was shared by all interviewees, from government and opposition alike, who were for the most part satisfied with the end result, if not the process that got them there. Unlike other bills in this study, significant concessions by the government were made in the Commons rather than the Lords. However, the threat of rejection in the Lords, coupled with the strong concerns expressed in the Commons, played an important role in forcing the government to concede earlier in the process than it might have done otherwise.

&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;WELFARE REFORM ACT 2007&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;i&gt;Individual MPs have very little or no influence - and not much more collectively. The longer that one is an MP, the harder it is to exactly pinpoint where power lies - Rt Hon Frank Field MP 33&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Welfare Reform Act 2007 reformed features of incapacity benefit and housing benefit (HB). Previous attempts by the Labour government to reform welfare provisions had led to large-scale rebellions, and many assumed that any further efforts would also prove highly controversial.34 However, the 2007 Act was characterised by a very smooth passage. There was a wide range of views as to the extent of the impact of MPs and peers-both individually and collectively-on the legislation.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;HOUSE OF COMMONS. Frank Field&amp;#39;s view cited above was shared by some parliamentarians. It is true there was little evidence of any significant changes within the Commons stages, although the amendments and concessions eventually brought forward in the Lords owed much to arguments made in the Commons. However, Labour MP Karen Buck noted that government backbenchers could see the prime minister, as well as secretaries of states, to raise concerns about policy issues, especially at the consultation stages. As she commented, ‘if you choose your case, be realistic and make a good case, you can effect change&amp;#39;, giving the example of the exemption of social housing from direct HB payments.35 The responsible minister in the Commons, Jim Murphy, said that one of the factors that can sway a minister is an argument that resonates with his or her constituency experience-citing issues relating to terminal illness and mental illness during the consideration of the Welfare Reform Bill.36&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;HOUSE OF LORDS. When the Bill reached the Lords, it became apparent that the government was prepared to move on a number of significant issues and various amendments were agreed.37 It readily accepted important changes on annual reporting, the definition of health care professionals and information sharing. According to the responsible minister in the Lords, Lord McKenzie of Luton, there were two issues on which the government did not wish to make concessions: the role of private contractors and housing benefit sanctions for anti-social behaviour. However, he explained that in order to preserve the consensual nature of the proceedings, the government decided to soften its position and introduce amendments on these areas as well.38 &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Conservative frontbencher Lord Skelmersdale recalled he had been in close touch with other peers about their views and concerns, the strength and depth of which he used to engage effectively in negotiation with&amp;nbsp;

the minister.39 Lord McKenzie pointed to the important role of crossbenchers in the Lords and the weight that their expertise in health and welfare issues carried, particularly when they engaged with external stakeholders. Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope also explained that he was telephoned by the minister to ask for his concerns on the Bill and was able to meet with the bill team, something which had rarely happened when he was an MP.40

&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;COMMITTEES AND POLITICAL PARTIES. Parliamentarians often have more impact when they act collectively, most obviously through political parties, but also through parliamentary committees. All MPs and peers rely upon their party&amp;#39;s brief. Liberal Democrat spokesperson Danny Alexander MP explained that the respective Liberal Democrat teams in the Commons and Lords met to provide a detailed handover from one House to the other and discuss tactics and goals.41 It was also explained that the opposition usually gets some reward for its efforts; a government frontbencher said that it is usually acknowledged through the agreement of an amendment or assurance. In addition, the work of select committees and all party groups were referred to at many points.42 Crucially, the recommendations of the Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee regarding the use of the affirmative procedure for secondary legislation in the Act were accepted by the government.43

&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;ASSESSMENT. The passage of the Welfare Reform Act went almost unnoticed. According to one official, because the Bill had ‘sailed through the Commons&amp;#39; the government was more willing to compromise in the Lords than might otherwise have been the case.44 It was keen to preserve the broad-based support for the Bill, which had been many years in the making and bore little relation to its earlier, more radical proposals. On the face of it, the Lords stages resulted in changes to issues which had been resisted in the Commons. It could appear that the Bill&amp;#39;s consideration led seamlessly to its final stage when Lords amendments-echoing concerns raised in the Commons- were accepted by the government without much tension. In fact, considerable negotiation and compromise led to the final settlement, which was clearly influenced by the strength of feeling in both Houses and especially the prospect of ‘ping-pong&amp;#39;.45

&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CONCLUSIONS&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In attempting to gauge the influence of Parliament on legislation, it is essential to remember that Parliament is not a collective body speaking with a unified voice; there are distinct and frequently opposing elements&amp;nbsp;

within Parliament, including two separate Houses containing MPs and peers who are further divided into government and opposition, party affiliated or independent, frontbench and backbench, working individually or collectively, supported by both non-partisan officials and politically motivated personal staff. Parliamentarians from the governing party are generally better placed to extract concessions from the government than those from the opposition parties, particularly if the government has a small majority. In the Lords, where no party has an overall majority, individual peers can make a significant difference. Parliamentarians can also have a greater impact if they have a long established expertise in a certain area. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The influence of parliamentarians, particularly those from the governing party, can be felt at the earliest stages of policy development. Many people have identified the importance of the anticipated reactions of MPs and peers, noting that this can imbue Parliament with the capacity to keep issues off the agenda.46 The Welfare Reform Act demonstrates that the anticipated reaction effect cannot be underestimated, as rebellions in 1997 and had the effect of influencing future government policy on welfare provision. In the case of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act, the anticipated reaction from the House of Lords contributed greatly to the drastic reshaping of the Bill.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;There are also a range of avenues through which parliamentarians can argue for the introduction of policies, either behind-the-scenes or via parliamentary or party processes. Angela Eagle MP used the Warwick Agreement between the Labour party and the unions to advocate for changes to equality legislation. Neil Gerrard MP also explained that ‘sometimes if you bang on about an issue for years, it might turn up in legislation years later&amp;#39;.47 When Frank Field MP first raised the notion of housing benefit penalties for anti-social behaviour in 2002, the idea had a mixed reception. However, eventually the government adopted a watered-down version in the 2007 Welfare Reform Act.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Select committees, which are becoming increasingly assertive and influential, provide an important mechanism by which parliamentarians&lt;br /&gt;of all parties can shape the legislative agenda. Committees now look at legislation far more than in the past and their evidence and findings make a difference, both directly and indirectly. This was certainly the case with the Export Control Act and the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Pre-legislative scrutiny, the process by which parliamentary committees consider draft bills before they enter the formal legislative process, provides an opportunity for members to give their views. However, of the five case studies, the Export Control Act was the only one published in draft. Committees also scrutinise green and white papers, as the Trade and Industry Committee did for the export control white reform green paper. With regards to the latter, most of its recommendations were fully or partially accepted.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Lords and Commons have distinct ways of dealing with legislation, and together they can place genuine pressure on government. It is commonplace to hear it said that it is the Lords that has the most impact on legislation. It is true that most changes to legislation during the parliamentary stage are made in the Lords, usually at report stage.48 However, the case studies reveal that the arguments raised and the assurances given in the Commons are frequently the determining factor in allowing the Lords to extract concessions. Lord Skelmersdale explained that ‘the Commons outlines the problems, gets the main political issues aired and the Lords then applies the resolution&amp;#39;. He asserted that the ‘much lower partisan temperature in the atmosphere&amp;#39; in the Lords allows this to happen.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;For example, only one of the case studies-the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act-was substantially amended in the Commons in the face of fierce opposition. The government had concluded that there was a real chance that it could be defeated at Commons report stage and was certain to have the Bill re-written in the Lords, so a preemptive move was necessary. Oliver Heald MP said that the Act demonstrated that ‘when there is a danger to democracy, people will come together to effect change - and change can be made&amp;#39;. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Most of the changes to the case studies were made in the Lords. Only a few were made in response to government defeats. During the passage of the Equality Act, the government lost one of only two votes to take place on an amendment in the Lords, leading to the removal of the controversial religious harassment clauses. The Lords also defeated the government twice when considering the Export Control Act, introducing new clauses on sustainable development and academic freedom. Although the former was overturned in the Commons and not insisted upon by the Lords, the unwillingness of the Lords to back down on the latter resulted in a compromise amendment formulated by the government in consultation with the opposition parties. It is clear from the case studies that the government&amp;#39;s efforts to avoid repeated defeats and the ‘ping-pong&amp;#39; of bills between the Houses further strengthens the role of the Lords.49 However, the advent of carry-over of bills between parliamentary sessions may diminish this effect, as there may be no strict deadline to force the government to compromise.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;However, the government usually makes concessions before it risks being defeated. For example, because the strength of feeling was against it on the introduction of protection against sexual orientation discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities and services, the government allowed Lords Alli and Lester to introduce amendments to the Equality Bill to enable regulations to be made in this area. For the same reason, the government substantially revised the first clause of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill at the start of Lords report

paper and the Work and Pensions Committee did for the welfare

stage, preserving in-country variation appeals. To preserve the spirit of consensus surrounding the Welfare Reform Bill, the government reluctantly introduced amendments concerning private contractors and housing benefit sanctions for anti-social behaviour.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;As the source for nearly all legislation, the government remains by far the most dominant force in the legislative process. This should come as little surprise within a parliamentary system in which the government, armed with a working Commons majority, has firm control on the levers of power.50 However, our five legislative case studies challenge the view that Parliament is a near-impotent force. In fact, Parliament, as a whole and through its constituent parts, makes a difference to legislation, sometimes in major ways, and more frequently through many minor but significant changes.51&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;i&gt;The Hansard Society is grateful to the Nuffield Foundation for the funding of this research.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;b&gt;ENDNOTES&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;1 The findings have been published in A. Brazier, S. Kalitowski and G. Rosenblatt with M. Korris, &lt;i&gt;Law in the Making: Influence and Change in the Legislative Process&lt;/i&gt;, Hansard Society, 2008, from which the content of this article is derived.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;2 We have focused on legislation developed and passed during the last decade, during which there has been only one political party in power with either an overwhelming or fairly comfortable majority. A different outcome at the next election is likely, and there are varying opinions as to what effect that may have on Parliament&amp;#39;s role and influence.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;3 In addition to Parliament, the study examines the role of the government and external actors such as lobbyists and the media on legislation.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;4 For the full findings, see A. Brazier, S. Kalitowski and G. Rosenblatt with M. Korris, &lt;i&gt;Law in the Making: Influence and Change in the Legislative Process&lt;/i&gt;, Hansard Society, 2008.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;5 Interview with Roger Berry MP, 18 March 2008.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;6 House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee (1998-1999), Strategic Export Controls, Second Report, HC 65.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;7 The Committee is made up of members from the Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees. In 2008, the Quadripartite Committee changed its name to the Committees on Strategic Export Controls. For further consideration of the work of the Committee, see Z. Yihdego, ‘Arms Sales and Parliamentary Accountability: The Role of the Quadripartite Committee&amp;#39;, &lt;i&gt;Parliamentary Affairs&lt;/i&gt;, 61(4), 2008, 661-680.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;8 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, &lt;i&gt;Draft Export Control and Non-Proliferation Bill&lt;/i&gt;, HC 445, 2000-2001.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;9 House of Lords Committee on Delegated Powers and Deregulation, &lt;i&gt;Twentieth Report&lt;/i&gt;, HL 72,2000-2001.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;10 Seventy-seven Labour MPs signed an EDM on sustainable development and trafficking and brokering tabled by Tony Worthington (EDM 469 2001/2002), and a later EDM from Ann Clwyd MP received the backing of nearly half of the Commons (EDM 826 2001/2002).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;11 Interview with an anonymous parliamentary official.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;12 HC Deb 9 July 2001, vol. 371 col. 577.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;13 Interview with Alan Wardle, Stonewall, 3 July 2007.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;14 Interview with John Bercow MP, 5 November 2007.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;15 Sex Equality (Duties of Public Authorities) Bill.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;16 HL Deb 9 November 2005, vol. 675 col. 634.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;17 HC Deb 16 January 2006, vol. 441 col. 664.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;18 Interview with Sam Smethers, Equal Opportunities Commission, 29 August 2007.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;19 Interview with Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC, 26 November 2007.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;20 Interview with Meg Munn MP, 15 January 2007.

&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;img src="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/aggbug.aspx?PostID=1499" width="1" height="1"&gt;</content><author><name>admin</name><uri>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/members/admin.aspx</uri></author><category term="PROGHOMEFEAT" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGHOMEFEAT/default.aspx" /><category term="PROGNEWS" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGNEWS/default.aspx" /></entry><entry><title>Recess negative: it's not perfect, but the portrayal of parliament as a government puppet bears little resemblance to reality</title><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/08/18/Comment-is-Free.aspx" /><id>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/08/18/Comment-is-Free.aspx</id><published>2008-08-18T10:17:00Z</published><updated>2008-08-18T10:17:00Z</updated><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;b style="font-style:italic;"&gt;&lt;a href="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/emptylords.bmp"&gt;&lt;img src="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/emptylords.bmp" style="width:116px;height:69px;" align="left" border="0" alt="" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;An article by Susanna Kalitowski, Research Fellow on the Hansard Society&amp;#39;s Parliament &amp;amp; Government Programme, originally published on &lt;a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/17/houseofcommons.lords" target="_blank" title="Comment is Free"&gt;Comment is Free&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&lt;br /&gt;The 11-week parliamentary recess is now under way, &lt;a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/yourview/1524767/Should-Parliament%27s-76-day-summer-recess-be-put-to-an-end.html" target="_blank"&gt;amid the familiar&lt;/a&gt;
annual charges of laziness and waste. Some MPs argue that the break
provides valuable time to catch up on important constituency work. &lt;a href="http://www.johnredwoodsdiary.com/2008/07/23/mps-locked-out-for-11-weeks/" target="_blank"&gt;Others&lt;/a&gt;, like John Redwood, disagree. &lt;a href="http://www.politicshome.com/Landing.aspx?Blog=2026&amp;amp;perma=link" target="_blank"&gt;Most political insiders&lt;/a&gt; seem to think it is too long. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But
do we really care whether MPs are sitting at Westminster anyhow? Many
believe the mother of parliaments no longer makes much of an impact and
that it simply serves to rubber-stamp &lt;a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/feb/25/comment.politics2" target="_blank"&gt;the government&amp;#39;s proposals&lt;/a&gt;. Even Gordon Brown waded into the debate over parliament&amp;#39;s effectiveness &lt;a href="http://www.totalpolitics.com/magazine/mag_features01.php" target="_blank"&gt;in a recent interview&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/controlpanel/blogs/" target="_blank"&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;in which he derided the institution for spending the majority of its
time debating &amp;quot;minor clauses of minor sections of minor bills&amp;quot; instead
of &amp;quot;the big issues of our time&amp;quot; such as climate change and terrorism.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Parliament
does spend a fair amount of time examining the PM&amp;#39;s legislation -
roughly a third of overall Commons&amp;#39; sitting time and &lt;a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldbrief/ldwork.htm" target="_blank"&gt;more than half&lt;/a&gt;
of time in the Lords - including bills this session on climate change
and terrorism. This is hardly a surprise, as parliament&amp;#39;s primary and
best-known function is to make laws that affect all of us on a daily
basis, regardless of whether they are &amp;quot;major&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;minor&amp;quot;. And although
the overwhelming majority of legislation is drawn up by the government,
it is parliament alone that has the power to pass, amend and even
repeal them. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Moreover, the portrayal of parliament as puppet
bears little resemblance to reality. If nothing changed between the day
that a bill left a government department and the day the Queen gave her
assent, then that would indeed be an indictment of parliament and the
legislative process. Thankfully, this is &lt;a href="http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/press_releases/archive/2008/07/17/parliamentary-scrutiny-does-make-a-difference-to-legislation-16-july-2008.aspx" target="_blank"&gt;far from the case&lt;/a&gt;.
Parliamentary scrutiny does make a significant difference to the
content of legislation. In fact, thanks to the increase over the past
decade in public consultation, the publication of draft bills and &lt;a href="http://www.revolts.co.uk/" target="_blank"&gt;backbench rebellions&lt;/a&gt;
- and a second chamber in which no single party enjoys a majority -
more changes are made to bills now than in the past. Sometimes this
change is dramatic - as in the case of the legislative and regulatory
reform bill, which the government was forced to re-write in order to
get it through the Commons. Usually, however, it is in small but
significant ways. For example, during parliament&amp;#39;s scrutiny of the
immigration, asylum and nationality bill, the government was pressured
to preserve appeal rights for visitors to the UK who seek to vary the
terms of their visas.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Nonetheless, the law-making process remains
far from perfect and lack of time remains a central part of the
problem. This, coupled with the &lt;a href="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/controlpanel/blogs/" target="_blank"&gt;sheer volume of legislation&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article4166890.ece" target="_blank"&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;- and its increasing complexity - makes it difficult for parliament to
carry out one of its key tasks to its fullest potential. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Parliamentary time is precious. Therefore a shorter recess or a return to the &lt;a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6105486.stm" target="_blank"&gt;ill-fated September sittings&lt;/a&gt;
might be welcome. At the very least, parliament and government should
explore further ways of using the existing parliamentary time more
efficiently. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;a href="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/publications/archive/2008/07/17/new-research-on-influencing-legislation-launched.aspx" target="_blank"&gt;Law in the Making: Influence and Change in the Legislative Process&lt;/a&gt; by Alex Brazier, Susanna Kalitowski and Gemma Rosenblatt, with Matt Korris, was recently published by the Hansard Society&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;b&gt;This article was originally published on &lt;a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/17/houseofcommons.lords?gusrc=rss&amp;amp;feed=politics" title="Comment is Free" target="_blank"&gt;Comment is Free &lt;/a&gt;on 17 August 2008.&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/aggbug.aspx?PostID=1380" width="1" height="1"&gt;</content><author><name>admin</name><uri>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/members/admin.aspx</uri></author><category term="PROGHOMEFEAT" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGHOMEFEAT/default.aspx" /><category term="PROGNEWS" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGNEWS/default.aspx" /></entry><entry><title>Your Parliament: make it work for you</title><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/07/24/Your-Parliament_3A00_-Make-it-work-for-you.aspx" /><id>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/07/24/Your-Parliament_3A00_-Make-it-work-for-you.aspx</id><published>2008-07-24T10:22:00Z</published><updated>2008-07-24T10:22:00Z</updated><content type="html">&lt;img src="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/photos/sample/images/1361/original.aspx" title="Your Parliament cover" alt="Your Parliament cover" align="left" /&gt; &lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Your Parliament&lt;/i&gt; explains the basics of the British political system: the work of Parliament, the role of MPs and peers, and how laws are made. &lt;/b&gt;It also describes how to get involved: through voting, contacting your MP or visiting the Houses of Parliament.&lt;b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &lt;i&gt;Your Parliament&lt;/i&gt; pamphlet provides clear, straightforward explanations on questions such as:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul style="margin-left:40px;"&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What is Parliament? How is the UK run?&lt;/li&gt;

&lt;li&gt;Who are MPs and peers? What do they do?&lt;/li&gt;

&lt;li&gt;What are political parties?&lt;/li&gt;

&lt;li&gt;How do I vote?&lt;/li&gt;

&lt;li&gt;How are new laws made?&lt;/li&gt;

&lt;li&gt;What goes on in Parliament?&lt;/li&gt;

&lt;li&gt;Why should I get involved?&lt;/li&gt;

&lt;li&gt;How can I get involved or find out more? &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Your Parliament&lt;/i&gt; is part of the Hansard Society&amp;#39;s ongoing work to inform and educate the public on the workings of Parliament and the political system. It is revised and updated from the 2004 version, and is published jointly with the Houses of Parliament.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;To download a free copy of &lt;i&gt;Your Parliament&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/files/folders/1369/download.aspx" title="Your Parliament - Download" target="_blank"&gt;click here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;img src="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/aggbug.aspx?PostID=1346" width="1" height="1"&gt;</content><author><name>admin</name><uri>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/members/admin.aspx</uri></author><category term="PROGHOME" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGHOME/default.aspx" /><category term="PROGNEWS" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGNEWS/default.aspx" /></entry><entry><title>Inside the sausage factory</title><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/07/14/inside-the-sausage-factory.aspx" /><id>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/07/14/inside-the-sausage-factory.aspx</id><published>2008-07-14T12:07:00Z</published><updated>2008-07-14T12:07:00Z</updated><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;img src="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/photos/sample/images/314/original.aspx" align="left" border="0" alt="" /&gt;Writing in &lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.housemag.co.uk/" title="The House Magazine" target="_blank"&gt;The House Magazine&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;Susanna Kalitowski introduces a Hansard Society study of the role of parliamentary scrutiny - which found MPs of all parties agreeing on the need to deliberate before you legislate&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;



























&lt;p&gt;Parliament&amp;#39;s primary and best-known function
is to make laws which affect all of us on a daily basis. However, there is
a widely held view that Parliament does not have much impact on the content of
legislation - that it simply puts a rubber stamp on the government&amp;#39;s
proposals. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It is clear that the government rarely loses a whole bill and that
it is only occasionally defeated on individual clauses. If nothing changed
between the day that a bill left a department and the day the Queen gave her
assent, then that would indeed be an indictment of the legislative process. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But
to what extent is this actually the case? While a great deal of public attention
is given to individual laws, the process by which policy proposals evolve into
acts of Parliament is not well understood.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In an effort to illuminate the law making
process - and Parliament&amp;#39;s role and influence in it - the Hansard Society undertook
a detailed study, funded by the Nuffield Foundation, of five recent pieces of
government legislation. We chose to ignore Bismarck&amp;#39;s advice that ‘laws are like
sausages: it is better not to see them being made&amp;#39; and tracked what happened as
they journeyed from the consultation stages, to pre-legislative scrutiny (if
undertaken), and through both Houses of Parliament. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We conducted over 80
interviews with ministers, MPs, peers, government and parliamentary officials and
pressure groups. At the heart of the study is a consideration of the influence that
parliamentarians themselves have on legislation. The results of our research
appear in a book published this week, &lt;i&gt;Law
in the making: influence and change in the legislative process.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;One of our most important findings is that
parliamentary scrutiny &lt;i&gt;does &lt;/i&gt;make a difference to a piece of legislation. Looking
at our five case studies, the government&amp;#39;s main proposals became law, but they were
altered measurably as they made their way through the legislative process.
Sometimes this change was dramatic, but usually it was in small but significant
ways.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;There is a tendency to judge the
relationship between Parliament and government in terms of clear-cut notions of
victory and defeat, dominance and submission. However, we found that rebellious
votes and government defeats reveal only a certain amount about the
relationship between Parliament and government, and that there are many other
approaches used to influence legislation that are not so easily measurable.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;For example, it is commonplace to hear it
that the Lords has more impact on legislation than the Commons. It is true that
it defeats the government more often than the Commons. Most changes to bills
are made in the Lords, usually at report stage, often in an effort to avoid a defeat.
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;However, our case studies reveal that the arguments raised and the assurances
given in the Commons are frequently the determining factor in allowing the
Lords to clinch the deal of extracting concessions. As a government minister
explained to us, ‘the Commons does the passing and then gives the Lords the
opportunity to score the goal and make the change.&amp;#39;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In addition, we found that on the whole,
external actors such as campaigners and lobbyists, working closely with
parliamentarians, can make a noticeable difference to the final shape of a
piece of legislation - often more than they themselves realise. On the other
hand, the impact of the media, which tends not to cover the process of
scrutiny, is far more variable.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A number of people we spoke to asserted
that Parliament&amp;#39;s scrutiny of legislation is improving, and that far more
changes are made to legislative proposals now than in the past. Nonetheless,
interviewees identified a number of obstacles which hinder scrutiny, including
lack of time and resources and the increasing volume and complexity of
legislation. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;We were also told that one of the highest barriers is cultural.
Parliamentarians from all parties explained that there is a predominant belief
within Whitehall
that to change a bill is a sign of weakness. Many said a cultural change is
needed in order for change to be viewed as possible- and even desirable.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Our study reveals that improved scrutiny
mechanisms such as pre-legislative scrutiny and a range of parliamentary and
external factors improve legislation without in any way affecting the
government&amp;#39;s ability to deliver its programme. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;However, it remains to be seen
whether there is any appetite for further moves towards a more deliberative
model of legislative consideration.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Law in the Making: influence and change in
the legislative process&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt; will be launched on
Wednesday 16 July 2008 at 2pm in the House of Commons. The event will feature a
keynote speech from the Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, Secretary of State for Justice
and Lord Chancellor. For more information, email &lt;a href="mailto:hans_admin@hansard.lse.ac.uk"&gt;hans_admin@hansard.lse.ac.uk&lt;/a&gt; or call 0207 438 1222.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;b&gt;This article was originallly published in &lt;a href="http://www.housemag.co.uk/" title="The House Magazine" target="_blank"&gt;The House Magazine&lt;/a&gt; on 14 July 2008&amp;nbsp;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;/b&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;



&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/aggbug.aspx?PostID=1384" width="1" height="1"&gt;</content><author><name>admin</name><uri>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/members/admin.aspx</uri></author><category term="PROGNEWS" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGNEWS/default.aspx" /></entry><entry><title>Law in the Making: a new publication by the Hansard Society</title><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/07/11/law-in-the-making-a-new-publication-by-the-hansard-society.aspx" /><id>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/07/11/law-in-the-making-a-new-publication-by-the-hansard-society.aspx</id><published>2008-07-11T10:40:00Z</published><updated>2008-07-11T10:40:00Z</updated><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/photos/sample/images/1300/original.aspx" title="Law in the Making" alt="Law in the Making" align="left" hspace="3" /&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;b&gt;Parliamentary scrutiny &lt;i&gt;does &lt;/i&gt;make a difference to legislation: &lt;/b&gt;new Hansard Society research challenges conventional view of Parliament’s effectiveness.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&amp;quot;Law in the Making is a fine piece of scholarship, which is forensic, balanced and informative. It is a thorough exploration of how policy ideas gradually evolve into binding law&amp;quot; – Rt Hon Jack Straw MP&amp;nbsp;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A new publication from the Hansard Society, &lt;i&gt;Law in the Making: Influence and Change in the Legislative Process&lt;/i&gt;, analyses the influences and elements that come together to make an act of Parliament and concludes that the widely-held view of Parliament as a ‘rubber stamp’ for government legislation bears little resemblance to reality.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The research draws upon the findings from five detailed case studies and over 80 exclusive interviews with ministers, MPs, peers, government and parliamentary officials and pressure groups. Key conclusions include:&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Although there is a predominant belief within government that to change a bill is a sign of weakness, parliamentary scrutiny &lt;b&gt;does &lt;/b&gt;make a difference to the final shape of an Act; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;MPs and peers, whether individually or collectively, have a larger impact than is commonly recognised;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;External actors have a marked influence on legislation, often by working closely with parliamentarians;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Parliamentary scrutiny has been enhanced in recent years, with more changes made to government bills;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Nonetheless, the volume and complexity of legislation continue to inhibit Parliament’s effectiveness.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;The study also suggests some recommendations for reform, including:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;More structured and straightforward government consultations;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;An increase in pre-legislative scrutiny;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Improvements to the committee stage.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;Fiona Booth, Hansard Society Chief Executive, commented: ‘Our research challenges the myth that government always gets its way. Parliamentary scrutiny, both in the Commons and the Lords, does make a significant difference to legislation.’&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="font-style:italic;"&gt;Law in the Making: Influence and Change in the Legislative Process&lt;/span&gt; was written by Alex Brazier, Susanna Kalitowski and Gemma Rosenblatt with Matt Korris.&amp;nbsp; It looks at five case studies, the Export Control Act 2002, the Equality Act 2006, the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, the Legislative and Regulatory Act 2006 and the Welfare Reform Act 2007, tracking them through various stages of the legislative process. It also considers a number of private members&amp;#39; bills.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;ISBN: 978 0900432 39 2 &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
	        
	    
	        &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Law in the Making&lt;/i&gt; was published on Wednesday July 16 at an event in Parliament with Rt Hon Jack Straw MP giving the keynote address. For more information about the launch event, &lt;a href="http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/upcoming_events/archive/2008/06/26/law-in-the-making-launch-event.aspx" title="Law in the Making launch"&gt;click here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The publication costs £10 (+ p&amp;amp;p). To order please &lt;a href="http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/themes/hansard/forms/publications.aspx?pub=Law%20in%20the%20Making" title="Order page"&gt;click here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;*** Special offer on Law in the Making - &lt;a href="http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/files/folders/1363/download.aspx" title="Law in the Making advert"&gt;click here&lt;/a&gt; ***&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Hansard Society is grateful to the &lt;a href="http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/" title="Nuffield Foundation" target="_blank"&gt;Nuffield Foundation&lt;/a&gt; for generously supporting this publication.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/aggbug.aspx?PostID=1310" width="1" height="1"&gt;</content><author><name>admin</name><uri>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/members/admin.aspx</uri></author><category term="PROGHOME" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGHOME/default.aspx" /><category term="PROGHOMEFEAT" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGHOMEFEAT/default.aspx" /><category term="PROGNEWS" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGNEWS/default.aspx" /></entry><entry><title>Hansard Society's Audit of Political Engagement discussed on Radio 4</title><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/06/02/hansard-society-s-audit-of-political-engagement-discussed-on-radio-4.aspx" /><id>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/06/02/hansard-society-s-audit-of-political-engagement-discussed-on-radio-4.aspx</id><published>2008-06-02T09:49:00Z</published><updated>2008-06-02T09:49:00Z</updated><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/photos/sample/images/1264/original.aspx" align="left" border="0" alt="" /&gt; Alex Brazier, Director of the Hansard Society&amp;#39;s Parliament and Government programme, was interviewed on his thoughts about political engagement (or the lack of it) as highlighted in the most recent &lt;a href="http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/downloads/pages/Audit-Series.aspx"&gt;Audit of Political Engagement&lt;/a&gt;. Tony Benn, Iain Dale, Anne McElvoy and Liam Fogarty also gave their thoughts on this issue. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;To listen to the programme click &lt;a href="http://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/files/folders/1273/download.aspx" target="_blank"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/aggbug.aspx?PostID=1265" width="1" height="1"&gt;</content><author><name>admin</name><uri>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/members/admin.aspx</uri></author><category term="PROGNEWS" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGNEWS/default.aspx" /></entry><entry><title>Parliament must do more to scrutinise government spending</title><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/04/21/parliament-must-do-more-to-scrutinise-government-spending-says-hansard-society.aspx" /><id>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/04/21/parliament-must-do-more-to-scrutinise-government-spending-says-hansard-society.aspx</id><published>2008-04-21T10:18:00Z</published><updated>2008-04-21T10:18:00Z</updated><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;img src="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/photos/sample/images/220/original.aspx" title="Fiscal Maze" alt="Fiscal Maze" align="left" /&gt;Liaison Committee’s recommendations on financial scrutiny a real step forward&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Hansard Society welcomes the House of Commons’ Liaison Committee &lt;a href="http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmliaisn/426/426.pdf" title="Liaison Committee report on financial scrutiny" target="_blank"&gt;report on financial scrutiny&lt;/a&gt; and urges Parliament to do more to scrutinise and seek accountability for government spending. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Hansard Society’s report &lt;a href="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/downloads/archive/2007/09/17/the-fiscal-maze-jul-2006.aspx" title="Fiscal Maze" target="_blank"&gt;The Fiscal Maze; Parliament, Government and Public Money&lt;/a&gt; (2006), made several proposals to improve Parliament’s financial scrutiny functions (detailed below). The Hansard Society welcomes the Liaison Committee’s recommendations which, if implemented, represent a real move in the right direction.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In particular, we endorse the Committee’s recommendations that there should be better and more comprehensible financial information from government and more time for debate and inquiry on government spending plans. Proposals to give Parliament opportunities to debate or vote on individual programmes or items of expenditure would strengthen Parliament’s scrutiny role. In total, the Committee’s proposals signal a change in how Parliament prioritises this crucial work.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Alex Brazier, Director of the Hansard Society Parliament and Government Programme, and joint author of The Fiscal Maze, commented:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&amp;#39;Effective scrutiny of government spending is essential for the operation of good government. Everyone - Parliament, Government and the public - has a strong interest in making sure that there is full transparency, debate and accountability of public money. The Liaison Committee&amp;#39;s proposals should make a difference in achieving that.’&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The&amp;nbsp; Fiscal Maze report’s recommendations included: &lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;Parliamentary committees should make greater use of the time between the pre-Budget report and the main Budget to take evidence on the government’s plans and feed its recommendations back to government; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Parliament should become fully involved in the process leading up to the Comprehensive Spending Review; &amp;nbsp;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;A parliamentary committee should consider the entire Finance Bill in draft;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Parliament should improve its scrutiny of tax legislation and administration; options include establishing a separate Tax Administration or Taxation Committee in the Commons; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;To give a higher priority to financial scrutiny, Parliament should consider piloting a Finance and Audit Sub-Committee for selected select committees. &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;There should be more systematic follow-up of the reports of the National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committee.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/downloads/archive/2007/09/17/the-fiscal-maze-jul-2006.aspx" title="Fiscal Maze" target="_blank"&gt;Click here&lt;/a&gt; to download a PDF of The Fiscal Maze; Parliament, Government and Public Money (A. Brazier &amp;amp; V. Ram, July 2006)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/aggbug.aspx?PostID=1205" width="1" height="1"&gt;</content><author><name>admin</name><uri>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/members/admin.aspx</uri></author><category term="PROGHOME" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGHOME/default.aspx" /><category term="PROGNEWS" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGNEWS/default.aspx" /></entry><entry><title>Playing to its strengths: Parliament and select committees  </title><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/04/15/playing-to-its-strengths-parliament-and-select-committees.aspx" /><id>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/04/15/playing-to-its-strengths-parliament-and-select-committees.aspx</id><published>2008-04-15T11:07:00Z</published><updated>2008-04-15T11:07:00Z</updated><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;img src="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/photos/sample/images/329/original.aspx" title="Select Committee" alt="Select Committee" align="left" /&gt;Playing to its strengths: Parliament and select committees&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Alex Brazier, Director, Parliament and Government Programme&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the past few years, the Hansard Society has produced a number of reports and studies which have looked at the role and operation of select committees. A consistent theme of this work has been that they represent one of the most successful aspects of the parliamentary process. The report of the Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny (2001), chaired by Lord Newton on Braintree, argued that select committees had a number of different strengths; their activity is not primarily determined by party political considerations; their structure provides a way to monitor the work of government departments and agencies; and they provide an important arena for scrutiny and accountability work which is not prescribed by the government’s business agenda. Also, further development of committees could provide MPs with an alternative career path which does not rely solely on the patronage of the political parties or involve making a career in government. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;For these reasons, the Scrutiny Commission proposed reforms which sought to build upon the best aspects of select committees and many of these have been subsequently implemented. These included the guidelines for core tasks for select committee work and the provision of improved support, which has been achieved through the formation of the Scrutiny Unit. We also proposed that select committee chairs should be paid to encourage as an alternative career path, although the extra payment awarded falls short of the Commission’s proposals that select committee chairman should be paid a salary equivalent to a junior minister.&amp;nbsp; Other developments, as varied as the appearance of the Prime Minister before the Liaison Committee and the appointment of media officers, which have significantly improved the coverage that select committee reports received, have in total improved the way that select committees hold government to account. A 2005 Hansard Society report, New Politics, New Parliament? concluded, ‘Several important reforms to the system have been agreed and implemented during 2001-2005 which have increased Parliament’s capacity to scrutinise the executive.’&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;More recently,&amp;nbsp; proposals in the Government’s Green Paper, The Governance of Britain,&amp;nbsp; may enhance the role of select committees, including greater scrutiny of public appointments and the formation of regional committees (although this latter proposal raises numerous issues about their structure and operation which the Modernisation Committee is currently considering). There are still many others reform outstanding. For example, government replies should be standardised and conform to set minimum standards. These should include an undertaking that a reply should address each of the committee’s recommendations in detail and engage more fully with the report’s evidence and conclusions. There should be greater support for chairmen, including additional staff and a substantially enhanced budget to undertake external research. Committees themselves should more systematically follow-up their work by publishing a review (three to five years after the original report) assessing how far their recommendations have been implemented.&amp;nbsp; There is also scope for further consideration of draft legislation and of financial matters. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;That is quite a list of potential tasks and clearly there is a limit to what committees can do with their current structure, especially bearing in mind the demands on their members. For that reason, the Hansard Society has put forward a range of options that would provide greater capacity, utilising the resource of the large number of backbench MPs who do not currently sit on a select committee.&amp;nbsp; These include having more select committees (possibly based around some cross-cutting themes e.g. the family, the elderly, or through splitting the responsibilities of some of the committees looking at the work of the bigger departments). Another possibility would include committees having more members, perhaps working through sub-committees. More fundamentally, Westminster should consider whether it wants to become a more committee-based institution and consider whether the chamber should not meet for one day a week to allow much more time for committee work (including also Public Bill Committees).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;But in addition to improved output and effectiveness, there is another important reason why select committees should strive for a greater role and impact. In the course of the Hansard Society’s work, it has become very clear that the public like the style of work that select committee undertake – at least once explanation was given about how they operate and their functions explained. The majority of people responded positively to their non-partisan nature, which was perceived as a more constructive way of working and allowed for real questioning of ministers and officials. Many supported the idea of select committees taking evidence across the country, and this has taken place successfully on a number of occasions already.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It makes good sense for any organisation to play to its strengths, particularly one which has to deal with issues of disconnection from those it serves. For that reason, giving a more central role to select committees, particularly within the Commons, should be a priority for future parliamentary reform.&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;-- This article was originally published in the &lt;a href="http://www.housemag.co.uk/" title="House Magazine" target="_blank"&gt;House Magazine&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/aggbug.aspx?PostID=1195" width="1" height="1"&gt;</content><author><name>admin</name><uri>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/members/admin.aspx</uri></author><category term="PROGNEWS" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGNEWS/default.aspx" /></entry><entry><title>Constitutional conundrums</title><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/04/15/constitutional-conundrums.aspx" /><id>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/04/15/constitutional-conundrums.aspx</id><published>2008-04-15T10:55:00Z</published><updated>2008-04-15T10:55:00Z</updated><content type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/photos/sample/images/330/original.aspx" title="Parliament" alt="Parliament" align="left" /&gt;An article discussing the Hansard Society&amp;#39;s recent publication, &lt;a href="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/03/27/audit5.aspx" title="Audit of Political Engagement 5"&gt;Audit of Political Engagement 5&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Constitutional
conundrums&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p style="font-style:italic;"&gt;Susanna Kalitowski, Research Fellow, Parliament and Government Programme&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;





&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;br /&gt;Gordon Brown has made constitutional
reform a centrepiece of his premiership. Less than a week after taking office,
he unveiled a &lt;a href="http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm71/7170/7170.pdf"&gt;green
paper&lt;/a&gt; which set out a dizzyingly wide range of options for enhancing the
accountability of the executive, the power of &lt;a href="http://www.parliament.uk/"&gt;Parliament&lt;/a&gt; and the rights and
responsibilities of citizens. It promised to consult and involve ‘all the
people of this country&amp;#39; in the formation of a ‘new constitutional settlement&amp;#39;.&lt;/p&gt;



&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/"&gt;Hansard Society&lt;/a&gt; has &lt;a href="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2007/10/16/hansard-society-response-to-the-governance-of-britain-consultation.aspx"&gt;welcomed&lt;/a&gt;
the proposals, many of which have been central to our work for decades. However,
our latest &lt;a href="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/downloads/pages/Audit-Series.aspx"&gt;Audit
of Political Engagement&lt;/a&gt; - an annual survey measuring public attitudes to
politics - reveals that the government&amp;#39;s task will be far from easy for two reasons:
1) most people know very little about constitutional issues and 2) there is a complete
lack of public consensus on what should be changed.&lt;/p&gt;



&lt;p&gt;Since the first Audit was
published in 2004, we have consistently found that well over half the
population professes little or no knowledge of politics; we were unsurprised to
discover a correspondingly high level of public ignorance about the country&amp;#39;s constitutional
arrangements in this year&amp;#39;s Audit. Only a quarter - or fewer - of the public
say they understand key components of the government&amp;#39;s constitutional reform
programme, such as the prerogative powers exercised without Parliament&amp;#39;s
approval or changes in the composition of the House of Lords. The Ministry of
Justice is about to launch a major public consultation on whether Britain
should adopt a &lt;a href="http://governance.justice.gov.uk/category/subjects/rights-and-responsibilities/"&gt;Bill
of Rights and Responsibilities&lt;/a&gt;, but a massive 68% of people have never
heard of or know hardly anything about this issue. &lt;/p&gt;



&lt;p&gt;This is entirely understandable. Britain&amp;#39;s
constitutional arrangements are hardly straightforward. The &lt;a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/88593.stm"&gt;unwritten constitution&lt;/a&gt;,
with its mysterious mix of statute and common law, parliamentary conventions
and works of authority, has long been the sole reserve of a small elite group
of constitutional lawyers and academics, as has the &lt;a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4267761.stm"&gt;royal prerogative&lt;/a&gt;, which
is even more nebulous. These issues are rarely explained to politics undergraduates,
let alone anyone else.&lt;/p&gt;



&lt;p&gt;To complicate matters further, there
is a complete lack of public consensus on priorities for reform, with even the
most popular choices identified by only a quarter or less of the population. Many
of the public&amp;#39;s top preferences are not covered in the government&amp;#39;s proposals. The
Audit has found that the constitutional issue that the greatest numbers of
people are dissatisfied with by far is Scottish MPs being able to vote on
English issues in the House of Commons - the so-called &lt;a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/talking_politics/82358.stm"&gt;West
Lothian Question&lt;/a&gt;; however the green paper has nothing to say about this subject.
Other key areas of public concern which go unmentioned in the government&amp;#39;s proposals
include &lt;a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6065322.stm"&gt;political
party funding&lt;/a&gt; and Britain&amp;#39;s
membership of the European Union. &lt;/p&gt;



&lt;p&gt;On the plus side, the public&amp;#39;s top
priority for change - how the &lt;a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/uk/2000/human_rights/default.stm"&gt;Human
Rights Act&lt;/a&gt; works in practice - is discussed, albeit in reference to a new
Bill of Rights. Reform of the prerogative powers - a cornerstone of the proposals
- is also cited as a top priority, although it is also one of the least
understood areas.&lt;/p&gt;



&lt;p&gt;Several of the other matters on
which the government proposes to consult are areas where the public are largely
content with the status quo, notably lowering the voting age from 18 to 16, reforming
the electoral system and introducing fixed-term parliaments. These issues are
comparatively well understood and do not even concern most people who are
unhappy with the present system of governing. The Audit has established little
or no correlation between attitudes to these issues and political engagement. &lt;/p&gt;



&lt;p&gt;What is more, the Audit reveals
that people&amp;#39;s views of constitutional arrangements are greatly affected by
their views of the government of the day. Supporters of the Conservatives and Liberal
Democrats are far more likely to express dissatisfaction with current
constitutional arrangements than Labour supporters. &lt;/p&gt;



&lt;p&gt;In the past, constitutional reform
was almost entirely an elite project, and therefore potentially much easier for
a government to undertake. However, in a modern democracy, it is essential that
the views of the public are genuinely taken on board, particularly at a time of
marked public disenchantment with politics, when nearly three quarters of
people agree that government does not spend enough time listening to the views
of individual members of the public (another Audit finding). &lt;/p&gt;



&lt;p&gt;Nonetheless, the lack of public understanding
and consensus will make it difficult - if not impossible - for the government
to meaningfully consult people on its reform plans in the short term, let alone
establish support for them. The consultation risks being dominated by a small
minority - or dismissed as a sham - unless serious efforts are made first to
educate the broader public about the political system and proposed reforms. &lt;/p&gt;



&lt;p&gt;It is vital that the government
has a clear strategy for responding to the views of the public and managing
their expectations. The constitutional reform proposals will require a far more
detailed form of consultation, response and consensus building than is usually
the case. &amp;nbsp;The effective dissemination of
information will also be crucial. Government and Parliament - and indeed all
those with a commitment to a healthy democratic system - should use this
opportunity to inform the public on the principles and operation of
parliamentary democracy and build consensus for reform. Just don&amp;#39;t expect it to
be easy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/aggbug.aspx?PostID=1191" width="1" height="1"&gt;</content><author><name>admin</name><uri>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/members/admin.aspx</uri></author><category term="PROGHOME" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGHOME/default.aspx" /><category term="PROGNEWS" scheme="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/tags/PROGNEWS/default.aspx" /></entry><entry><title>Hung-up over nothing? The impact of a hung parliament on British politics</title><link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/04/15/hung-up-over-nothing-the-impact-of-a-hung-parliament-on-british-politics.aspx" /><id>http://www.hansard-society.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/04/15/hung-up-over-nothing-the-impact-of-a-hung-parliament-on-british-politics.aspx</id><published>2008-04-15T09:43:00Z</published><updated>2008-04-15T09:43:00Z</updated><content type="html">&lt;img src="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/photos/sample/images/1045/original.aspx" title="Hung Parliament" alt="Hung Parliament" align="left" /&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following article was written for the &lt;a href="http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/" title="Parliamentary Affairs" target="_blank"&gt;Parliamentary Affairs&lt;/a&gt; journal and can be accessed online &lt;a href="http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/61/2/396" title="Hung-up over Nothing? The Impact of a Hung Parliament on British Politics" target="_blank"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;. More information on the Hansard Society&amp;#39;s publication No Overall Control can be found &lt;a href="http://hansardsociety.org.uk/blogs/parliament_and_government/archive/2008/02/28/no-overall-control-the-impact-of-a-hung-parliament-on-british-politics.aspx" title="No Overall Control"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Hung-up over nothing? The impact of a hung parliament on
British politics&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Susanna Kalitowski&lt;b&gt;&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/b&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;In the past few years, there has been increasing speculation
that the next UK general election will produce a Parliament in which no single party holds a
majority of seats in the House of Commons. In common parlance, this is referred
to as a ‘hung parliament’, although some prefer the expressions ‘balanced
parliament’, ‘minority parliament’ or ‘No Overall Control’ (NOC).&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; In the UK,
it is relatively rare for the Westminster Parliament to be ‘hung’ following an
election; however, the probability is increasing due to the growth of third
parties and the way that the electoral system translates popular votes into
Commons seats. At regular intervals throughout the past two years, opinion
polls have regularly predicted that the next general election is likely to
produce a hung parliament.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Although they are common in other democracies, hung
parliaments have traditionally been viewed in the UK as unwelcome aberrations that
produce short-lived and ineffectual governments. In light of the increasing
likelihood of a hung parliament, the Hansard Society believes the time is right
to explore what impact it might have on British politics. As a non-partisan
organisation, we are neither ‘for’ nor ‘against’ a hung parliament. We
recognise that all parties seek to win any election they contest outright.
However, as part of our promotion of effective parliamentary democracy, we
believe it would be prudent to shed light on the issues that might arise in the
event of a hung parliament. Our new book, No Overall Control?, contains
chapters by distinguished academics, politicians and commentators on the key
issues surrounding a House of Commons with no overall majority.&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt; It examines
the history of hung parliaments in the UK, constitutional and procedural
issues, lessons from other Westminster-style systems where majority governments
are less common, and how a hung parliament affects the functioning of
Parliament, the prospects for electoral reform and public opinion. This article
provides an overview of some of the book&amp;#39;s key findings.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Hung parliaments: a rarity?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;THE UK&amp;#39;s First Past the Post electoral system has traditionally acted as a barrier to a
hung parliament, as it usually rewards the party with the most votes with a
disproportionately high number of seats. Westminster has not experienced a hung
parliament since 1974, and there were only four others in the twentieth century
after the following general elections: January 1910, December 1910, December
1923 and May 1929.&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt; However, both Vernon Bogdanor and David Butler note that
majority governments may not be as predominant as we may think; for 34 of the
last 100 years, Britain has experienced coalition or minority rule, with the
latter being far more common (see Table 1).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;table cellpadding="1" cellspacing="0"&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td colspan="2"&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Table 1: Government Composition: 1906-2007&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;

&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1906-1910&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;

&lt;td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Liberal&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;

&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1910-1915&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;

&lt;td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Minority&lt;/i&gt; Liberal&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;

&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1915-1922&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;

&lt;td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Coalition&lt;/i&gt; Lib Con&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;

&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1922-1923&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;

&lt;td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Conservative&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;

&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1924&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;

&lt;td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Minority&lt;/i&gt; Labour&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;

&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1924-1929&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;Conservative&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;1929-1931&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Minority&lt;/i&gt; Labour&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;1931-1940&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Coalition&lt;/i&gt; Con dominant&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;1940-1945&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Coalition&lt;/i&gt; all-party&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;1945-1951&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;Labour&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;1951-1964&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;Conservative&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;1964-1970&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;Labour&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;1970-1974&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;Conservative&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;1974&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Minority&lt;/i&gt; Labour&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;1974-1976&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;Labour&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;1976-1979&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Minority&lt;/i&gt; Labour&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;1979-1997&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;Conservative&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;1997&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;Minority&lt;/i&gt; Conservative&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;1997-2008&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;Labour&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;

&lt;br /&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;This fact has perhaps been eclipsed by a decade of Labour
majority government and large Conservative majorities in the 1980s. However,
outside Westminster, other British political
institutions are rapidly learning to adapt to a situation in which no political
party achieves a majority of seats, as it is increasingly common in the
devolved institutions in Scotland
and Wales
as well as in local councils.&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Moreover, the likelihood of a hung parliament has
significantly increased in recent years due to the decline in two-party
dominance and changes in the relation between seats and votes. During the past
50 years, the number of MPs from outside the two major parties has increased
from one per cent of Members to 14 per cent. As David Butler explains, ‘the
no-man&amp;#39;s land between a clear majority for one side and a clear majority for
the other has expanded more than tenfold and so has the chance of a hung
parliament ... landslides are smaller than they used to be and narrow
majorities have become narrower.’ He cites the calculations of Rallings and
Thresher which demonstrate that there is a six per cent no-man&amp;#39;s land between a
clear Conservative majority and clear Labour majority which would result in a
hung parliament (see Table 2).&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;


&lt;table cellpadding="1" cellspacing="0"&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td colspan="6"&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Table 2: Outcomes at the next election&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p&gt;Con %&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; Lab%&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;Con MPs&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;Lab MPs&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;Other MPs&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;Majority&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;35%&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;35%&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;234&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;330&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;86&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;i&gt;Lab&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; +4&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;36%&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;34%&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;252&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;305&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;93&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;Lab -21&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;37%&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;33%&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;269&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;292&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;89&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;Lab&amp;nbsp; -34&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;38%&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;32%&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;287&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;274&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;89&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;Con -39&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;39%&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;31%&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;302&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;261&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;87&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;Con -24&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;40%&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;30%&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;319&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;245&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;86&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;Con&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; -7&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
 
&lt;tr&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;41%&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;29%&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;336&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;231&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;83&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
  
&lt;td&gt;
  
&lt;p align="center"&gt;&lt;i&gt;Con +10&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/td&gt;
 &lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;

&lt;br /&gt;While the electoral system currently favours Labour,
boundary changes in 2007 have reduced its majority by around a half, giving the
party only between 30 and 40 seats more than the other parties rather than the
64 seats they enjoy at the moment. Thus, even a small swing against the
incumbent party to the opposition would see Labour&amp;#39;s overall majority
disappear. Yet, while it may be relatively easy for the Conservatives to
deprive Labour of their majority, it will be more difficult for them to secure
an overall majority, as they would need to win over 42 per cent of the popular
vote. This is no easy feat, considering that Labour clearly won the last
election with only 35.3% of the vote. 

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Constitutional dilemmas?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;A hung parliament makes it more challenging to form a
government following a general election, as it may not be obvious who should be
appointed the prime minister. Each hung parliament in the past has produced a
slightly different outcome. However, one of four things will generally occur:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;1.&lt;span&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Formation of
a single-party minority government with outside support and operating on an
agreed programme (as in 1910); &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;2.&lt;span&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Formation of
a single-party minority government living day-to-day (as in 1923, 1929 and
1974); &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;3.&lt;span&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Formation of
a majority coalition; &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;4.&lt;span&gt;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; &lt;/span&gt;Dissolution
of Parliament.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;In Westminster,
single-party minority government rather than coalition has been the rule,
generally by the party which has won the highest number of seats (even if by a
very small margin). At no time during the twentieth century did the leader of
the second largest party become the prime minister. During this period,
coalitions have only emerged from war or economic crisis; Disraeli&amp;#39;s
oft-repeated remark that ‘England
does not love coalitions’ has been born out thus far. However, the same cannot
be said for Scotland and Wales.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-style:italic;"&gt;The role of the prime minister&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;In contrast to some other political systems, British
constitutional arrangements do not require the prime minister to resign
immediately after an election that produces a hung parliament. The convention
is that he or she is free to remain in office until losing the confidence of
the Commons. As Vernon Bogdanor remarks, support in the Commons can mean that
the government commands the support of a majority; however, it can also mean
that there is no majority in the Commons against it. This convention has served
to facilitate minority governments and discourage coalitions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The incumbent prime minister has three options in the event
of a hung parliament: resign immediately (as Baldwin did in 1929); only resign
if defeated after a vote in the Commons (as Baldwin did earlier in 1923); or
solicit support from other parties and only resign if it is not forthcoming (as
Asquith did twice successfully in 1910 and Heath unsuccessfully in 1974). Some
authorities also maintain that the prime minister can legitimately ask the
monarch for a second dissolution of Parliament following a hung parliament,
though this is controversial and has never happened—and would involve a
considerable political gamble.&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt; &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;


&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;span style="font-style:italic;"&gt;The role of the sovereign&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;


&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;IN Britain&amp;#39;s
constitutional monarchy, the sovereign has retained a variety of ancient
personal prerogative powers. In the event of a hung parliament, three
potentially come into play: inviting someone to form a government, dismissing
ministers from office and dissolving Parliament. Although convention dictates
that the sovereign must act impartially and, whenever possible, upon the advice
of a responsible minister, the circumstances of a hung parliament may force her
to exercise a certain degree of discretion which has the potential to lead to
accusations of political bias. For example, she will have to choose who to
appoint if the incumbent prime minister resigns immediately or is defeated in
the Commons. Should she consider dissolving Parliament again?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;It is for this reason that some have called for reform of
the sovereign&amp;#39;s personal prerogatives. The Fabian Society&amp;#39;s Commission on the
Future of the Monarchy called for dissolution of Parliament to be strictly
regulated by statute and for the appointment of the prime minister to be a
matter for Parliament.&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt; It has been suggested elsewhere that the Speaker of the
House could appoint the prime minister.&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;However, after years of reflection on the role of the
sovereign in the event of a hung parliament, Vernon Bogdanor has come to
believe that it would not pose any constitutional problems for the Queen. This
is because he thinks the fundamental convention of parliamentary
government—that government must retain the confidence of the House of
Commons—would remain unaltered by hung parliament. There is no reason why
negotiations between the political leaders should involve the sovereign. Even
if the sovereign was involved, she would remain a facilitator, not a
negotiator. Bogdanor asserts that hung parliaments serve to expose the
fundamental, yet rarely discussed, principle of parliamentary government: that
a government depends upon the confidence of Parliament.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;b&gt;Lessons from outside of Westminster&lt;/b&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;HUNG parliaments have not been uncommon in parliamentary
democracies overseas, including in other Westminster-style systems. The
experiences of the devolved institutions of Wales
and Scotland, as well as Canada are instructive.
In these contexts, hung parliaments have produced surprisingly stable
governments with few of the dire consequences usually suggested.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;i&gt;WALES&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Since the Welsh Assembly&amp;#39;s establishment in 1999, both
minority administrations and coalitions—some very unlikely—have been more
common than single-party majority administrations. The proportional electoral
system in Cardiff—the Additional Member System
(AMS)—is much more likely to deliver coalition or minority governments than Westminster&amp;#39;s First Past
the Post system. Coalition governments have proved to be more workable and
stable than minority administrations (or majority administrations founded on a
tiny majority). However, political parties in Wales have been reluctant to form a
coalition; negotiations to form one, following the 2007 election, took over two
months. To everyone&amp;#39;s surprise, they resulted in the least likely of
combinations: Labour–Plaid Cymru.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Roseanne Palmer, Stephen Thornton and Mark Crowley conclude
that the clear message from Wales
is that political parties in the UK can adapt to a system where
single-party majority government is the exception rather than the rule; if push
comes to shove, all parties have demonstrated a willingness to cooperate in
forming coalition government. However, while party elites are gradually
adapting to multi-party government, everyone else—including party members, the
public and the media—is ‘still trying to play the game according to the old
Westminster rules’.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;i&gt;SCOTLAND&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Like the Welsh Assembly, the Scottish Parliament has
predominantly had coalition or minority government since its establishment in
1999, again due to its use of the AMS form of voting. Indeed, it was designed
to do just this in order to forge a more consensual ‘new politics’. For the
Parliament&amp;#39;s first eight years, Labour and the Liberal Democrats governed as a
coalition. James Mitchell suggests that the experience was not all that
different from majority government. Parties remained cohesive and mostly obeyed
the whips.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;From May 2007 onwards, however, the Scottish National Party
(SNP) has governed as a minority government with support from the Green Party
that does not quite amount to a traditional confidence and supply agreement.
Mitchell feels that the new minority government has the potential to
significantly alter Scottish politics. The old distinction between being in and
out of power is blurred with minority government, and all parties, if they play
their cards well, can influence the public policy agenda. Mitchell concludes
that the experience of the Scottish Parliament demonstrates that ‘new
institutions alone do not result in new cultures.’ However, as in Wales, the
parties themselves do not seem to have quite grasped this.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;i&gt;CANADA&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The Canadian Parliament is modelled on Westminster and uses the First Past the Post
system of voting. However, hung parliaments—known as minority parliaments—are
more common than in the UK
and are becoming more frequent. As in the UK,
coalitions are not a regular feature of minority governments in Canada, and the
governing party usually works with the smaller opposition parties on an ad hoc
basis. Although minority parliaments tend to be shorter-lived than their
majority counterparts, David Docherty insists that they are far from the
‘legislative eunuchs’, as some portray them. For example, Lester Pearson, a
prime minister responsible for some of the most important policy innovations in
the twentieth century, never governed with a majority. Docherty goes so far as
to claim that minority governments are often a ‘more sensitive and responsive
form of government’.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;He argues that the Canadian experience has shown that
minority governments can be very successful, but this is more likely when they
govern as a minority, not as a majority. They must be willing to negotiate with
other parties, and Docherty notes that moderate parties are usually more
willing to do this. He also observes that minority governments which replace
long sitting governments are more likely to have a shorter life span than
minority governments which were formerly majority governments. Finally, he
recommends that traditional notions of confidence be relaxed in the event of a
hung parliament to facilitate a more consensual style of politics.&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;b&gt;The impact of a hung parliament at Westminster&lt;/b&gt; &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;IT might be expected that an unclear election result would
cause immediate difficulties in Parliament. How might it affect parliamentary
procedures and business, as well as the role of MPs and peers?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;i&gt;PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURES&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Alex Brazier maintains that a hung parliament would not
disrupt the functioning of Parliament as its established procedure, he writes,
is ‘well-equipped to deal with such a contingency’ and indeed has done so in
the past. How the House of Commons worked on those occasions provides some indication
of what might happen in a hung parliament of the future.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Experience has shown that a hung parliament need not
necessarily delay the start of the parliamentary session. The parliamentary
machinery is set up to run automatically for the first few weeks. The House
will meet on the day set by the previous government in the election
proclamation, and its first task it to elect a Speaker. The choice of Speaker
would proceed separately from any discussions about forming a government.
Brazier notes that recent procedural change has formalised the convention that
if the previous Speaker has not retired but is returned—standing in the
constituency as a Speaker without partisan opposition—he or she should be
re-elected. However, he concedes that a hung parliament may place some pressure
on the role of the Speaker, making it more likely that his or her casting vote
will have to be exercised.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Furthermore, unlike in Scotland
and Wales,
there is no fixed date by which the executive must be appointed, nor is a vote
required to secure the appointment. The first vote that a new government would
need to win would occur at the end of the debate on the Queen&amp;#39;s Speech, which
may take place as long as a month after the election. The loss of any of the
votes at the end of the debate would have the same effect as a no confidence
motion and would force the government to resign. Assuming the government wins
this crucial and potentially perilous vote, it would not be expected to face a
major challenge in the House for a month or two. Alex Brazier asserts that its
survival would be largely dependant on the attitude of the opposition and
whether it wants to defeat the government and thus cause another general
election.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;i&gt;IMPACT ON THE COMMONS&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;A hung parliament would certainly shake up the operation of
the House of Commons, where the Labour Party has had a strong majority for over
a decade. A number of contributors to No Overall Control? highlight the
inexperience of most MPs with minority governments; nearly two-thirds of
current MPs were elected in 1997 or later and have no experience of a
government without a strong majority or even of another party in power.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Alex Brazier maintains that a hung parliament would greatly
affect MPs, for they would be required to be present at many more votes. It
would also give them more opportunities to extract concessions from the
government. However, he predicts that they would continue to spend a great deal
of their time on constituency matters, which would be largely unaffected by a
hung parliament.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Philip Cowley considers what effect a hung parliament might
have on backbench MPs. He argues that behaviour would be largely dependant on
their political party. If Labour was the largest party in a minority
administration or coalition, MPs would behave very differently than if the
Conservatives were. Labour MPs are no more likely to rebel against the whip
than their Conservative counterparts, but first-term governments tend to be
more disciplined for a variety of reasons. The Labour Party has been the governing
party for over a decade, and the rate of backbench rebellion has increased over
time. Moreover, in the past, Labour MPs have tended to rebel more frequently
when the party has been in minority status.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Cowley suggests that the behaviour of the Liberal Democrats
in the event of a hung parliament would be much harder to predict. However,
they would play a crucial role as the swing voters in any hung parliament, much
as they do now in the House of Lords. While the Liberal Democrats have
traditionally been assumed to be closer to Labour, they are currently three
times more likely to vote with the Conservatives than Labour.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;i&gt;IMPACT ON THE LORDS&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Since the removal of most hereditary peers in 1999, no
single party has been able to command a majority in the House of Lords, making
it difficult for the government to predict whether and when it will get its
business through. Government defeats in the Lords since then have been more
frequent, with 64 defeats in the 2003–2004 session compared with 31 in the
1998–1999 session.&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt; Russell and Sciara have argued that the Commons and the
Lords are also increasingly acting in partnership to achieve legislative
change.&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt; For example, in 2006, MPs backed a Lords amendment to the Racial and
Religious Hatred Bill and defeated the government in the House of Commons, and
the two Houses similarly collaborated to defeat the government on the Identity
Cards and Police and Justice Bills.&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Both Brazier and Cowley suggest that a hung parliament might
serve to weaken the Lords&amp;#39; ability to defeat the government if it resulted in a
coalition government. This could have the effect of delivering safer and larger
majorities in the Lords, paradoxically delivering more control over government
business than has been the case since 1999. Indeed, it is possible that
legislation might make its way through Parliament more smoothly under a
coalition government than a majority government.&lt;br /&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;b&gt;Would the public notice?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;


&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;IT has been declared by some that a hung parliament would
revitalise public interest in politics. But what, if anything, do we know about
the public&amp;#39;s view? Mark Gill finds that there has been little research into
public understanding of, or attitudes towards, a hung parliament. The data that
does exist reveals a lack of public consensus about what type of government is
most preferable: majority, minority or coalition. In surveys conducted in 1991
and 1995, twice as many people strongly favoured one party in government rather
than two or more forming a coalition, but very few people exhibited a strong
preference either way.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Moreover, the public often expresses seemingly contradictory
views on the subject. On the one hand, polls have revealed that a single-party
government is viewed as the most stable form of government; however, the public
is also attracted to a coalition style government on the grounds that it would
be more likely to serve a wider range of interests. Gill suggests these
apparently opposing views actually reflect the usual competing demands of the
public on government. People want stable and effective government—which they
may feel may be more likely to be achieved by single-party rule—but they might
also consider that a coalition government would be more likely to serve the
broader national interest.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;In any case, most people will have thought very little about
the next general election, which is not expected to take place until 2009 or
2010, so it is difficult to speculate whether they would welcome or be wary of
a hung parliament. However, their views will be largely shaped by media debates
and commentaries. The Labour and Conservative Parties are likely to portray it
as a recipe for weak government, though Gill suggests that the experience of Scotland and Wales may render this argument
unconvincing. The Liberal Democrats may welcome the possibility of a hung
parliament, but as both Simon Hughes and Austin Mitchell acknowledge, it is
virtually impossible to campaign for a hung parliament. There is evidence that
many voters, particularly Liberal Democrat supporters, would be prepared to
vote for a party they don&amp;#39;t normally support in order to help shape a
particular national outcome.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Any election that produces a hung parliament would probably have
a very high-voter turnout, since it is likely to be extremely competitive.&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;
However, voting alone does not necessarily engage people in politics. Moreover,
levels of public interest in politics have remained extraordinarily stable over
the past four decades, and distrust of politicians is ‘deeply entrenched in the
British psyche’. Gill argues that the most plausible way in which a hung
parliament could be a catalyst for improving the relationship between politics
and the public is if it leads to a stable coalition government, presumably
where the Liberal Democrats were the junior coalition partner to either Labour
or the Conservatives.&lt;sup&gt;15&lt;/sup&gt; The coalition government could claim that it
represented more than half the voting public, and possibly more than 60 per
cent. However, it would inevitably raise expectations about a new era in
politics which it may not be capable of delivering. The coalition would have to
demonstrate that it was unified and addressed issues of national concer