Hung-up over nothing? The impact of a hung parliament on British politics

The following article was written for the Parliamentary Affairs journal and can be accessed online here. More information on the Hansard Society's publication No Overall Control can be found here.

 
 

Hung-up over nothing? The impact of a hung parliament on British politics

Susanna Kalitowski¹

 

In the past few years, there has been increasing speculation that the next UK general election will produce a Parliament in which no single party holds a majority of seats in the House of Commons. In common parlance, this is referred to as a ‘hung parliament’, although some prefer the expressions ‘balanced parliament’, ‘minority parliament’ or ‘No Overall Control’ (NOC).² In the UK, it is relatively rare for the Westminster Parliament to be ‘hung’ following an election; however, the probability is increasing due to the growth of third parties and the way that the electoral system translates popular votes into Commons seats. At regular intervals throughout the past two years, opinion polls have regularly predicted that the next general election is likely to produce a hung parliament.

 

Although they are common in other democracies, hung parliaments have traditionally been viewed in the UK as unwelcome aberrations that produce short-lived and ineffectual governments. In light of the increasing likelihood of a hung parliament, the Hansard Society believes the time is right to explore what impact it might have on British politics. As a non-partisan organisation, we are neither ‘for’ nor ‘against’ a hung parliament. We recognise that all parties seek to win any election they contest outright. However, as part of our promotion of effective parliamentary democracy, we believe it would be prudent to shed light on the issues that might arise in the event of a hung parliament. Our new book, No Overall Control?, contains chapters by distinguished academics, politicians and commentators on the key issues surrounding a House of Commons with no overall majority.³ It examines the history of hung parliaments in the UK, constitutional and procedural issues, lessons from other Westminster-style systems where majority governments are less common, and how a hung parliament affects the functioning of Parliament, the prospects for electoral reform and public opinion. This article provides an overview of some of the book's key findings.

 

 

Hung parliaments: a rarity?

THE UK's First Past the Post electoral system has traditionally acted as a barrier to a hung parliament, as it usually rewards the party with the most votes with a disproportionately high number of seats. Westminster has not experienced a hung parliament since 1974, and there were only four others in the twentieth century after the following general elections: January 1910, December 1910, December 1923 and May 1929.⁴ However, both Vernon Bogdanor and David Butler note that majority governments may not be as predominant as we may think; for 34 of the last 100 years, Britain has experienced coalition or minority rule, with the latter being far more common (see Table 1).

Table 1: Government Composition: 1906-20075
1906-1910	Liberal
1910-1915	Minority Liberal
1915-1922	Coalition Lib Con
1922-1923	Conservative
1924	Minority Labour
1924-1929	Conservative
1929-1931	Minority Labour
1931-1940	Coalition Con dominant
1940-1945	Coalition all-party
1945-1951	Labour
1951-1964	Conservative
1964-1970	Labour
1970-1974	Conservative
1974	Minority Labour
1974-1976	Labour
1976-1979	Minority Labour
1979-1997	Conservative
1997	Minority Conservative
1997-2008	Labour

This fact has perhaps been eclipsed by a decade of Labour majority government and large Conservative majorities in the 1980s. However, outside Westminster, other British political institutions are rapidly learning to adapt to a situation in which no political party achieves a majority of seats, as it is increasingly common in the devolved institutions in Scotland and Wales as well as in local councils.⁶

 

Moreover, the likelihood of a hung parliament has significantly increased in recent years due to the decline in two-party dominance and changes in the relation between seats and votes. During the past 50 years, the number of MPs from outside the two major parties has increased from one per cent of Members to 14 per cent. As David Butler explains, ‘the no-man's land between a clear majority for one side and a clear majority for the other has expanded more than tenfold and so has the chance of a hung parliament ... landslides are smaller than they used to be and narrow majorities have become narrower.’ He cites the calculations of Rallings and Thresher which demonstrate that there is a six per cent no-man's land between a clear Conservative majority and clear Labour majority which would result in a hung parliament (see Table 2).
 

Table 2: Outcomes at the next election7
Con %	Lab%	Con MPs	Lab MPs	Other MPs	Majority
35%	35%	234	330	86	Lab   +4
36%	34%	252	305	93	Lab -21
37%	33%	269	292	89	Lab  -34
38%	32%	287	274	89	Con -39
39%	31%	302	261	87	Con -24
40%	30%	319	245	86	Con   -7
41%	29%	336	231	83	Con +10

While the electoral system currently favours Labour, boundary changes in 2007 have reduced its majority by around a half, giving the party only between 30 and 40 seats more than the other parties rather than the 64 seats they enjoy at the moment. Thus, even a small swing against the incumbent party to the opposition would see Labour's overall majority disappear. Yet, while it may be relatively easy for the Conservatives to deprive Labour of their majority, it will be more difficult for them to secure an overall majority, as they would need to win over 42 per cent of the popular vote. This is no easy feat, considering that Labour clearly won the last election with only 35.3% of the vote.

 

Constitutional dilemmas?

A hung parliament makes it more challenging to form a government following a general election, as it may not be obvious who should be appointed the prime minister. Each hung parliament in the past has produced a slightly different outcome. However, one of four things will generally occur:

 

1.         Formation of a single-party minority government with outside support and operating on an agreed programme (as in 1910);

2.         Formation of a single-party minority government living day-to-day (as in 1923, 1929 and 1974);

3.         Formation of a majority coalition;

4.         Dissolution of Parliament.

 

In Westminster, single-party minority government rather than coalition has been the rule, generally by the party which has won the highest number of seats (even if by a very small margin). At no time during the twentieth century did the leader of the second largest party become the prime minister. During this period, coalitions have only emerged from war or economic crisis; Disraeli's oft-repeated remark that ‘England does not love coalitions’ has been born out thus far. However, the same cannot be said for Scotland and Wales.

 

The role of the prime minister

In contrast to some other political systems, British constitutional arrangements do not require the prime minister to resign immediately after an election that produces a hung parliament. The convention is that he or she is free to remain in office until losing the confidence of the Commons. As Vernon Bogdanor remarks, support in the Commons can mean that the government commands the support of a majority; however, it can also mean that there is no majority in the Commons against it. This convention has served to facilitate minority governments and discourage coalitions.

 

The incumbent prime minister has three options in the event of a hung parliament: resign immediately (as Baldwin did in 1929); only resign if defeated after a vote in the Commons (as Baldwin did earlier in 1923); or solicit support from other parties and only resign if it is not forthcoming (as Asquith did twice successfully in 1910 and Heath unsuccessfully in 1974). Some authorities also maintain that the prime minister can legitimately ask the monarch for a second dissolution of Parliament following a hung parliament, though this is controversial and has never happened—and would involve a considerable political gamble.⁸

 

The role of the sovereign

IN Britain's constitutional monarchy, the sovereign has retained a variety of ancient personal prerogative powers. In the event of a hung parliament, three potentially come into play: inviting someone to form a government, dismissing ministers from office and dissolving Parliament. Although convention dictates that the sovereign must act impartially and, whenever possible, upon the advice of a responsible minister, the circumstances of a hung parliament may force her to exercise a certain degree of discretion which has the potential to lead to accusations of political bias. For example, she will have to choose who to appoint if the incumbent prime minister resigns immediately or is defeated in the Commons. Should she consider dissolving Parliament again?

 

It is for this reason that some have called for reform of the sovereign's personal prerogatives. The Fabian Society's Commission on the Future of the Monarchy called for dissolution of Parliament to be strictly regulated by statute and for the appointment of the prime minister to be a matter for Parliament.⁹ It has been suggested elsewhere that the Speaker of the House could appoint the prime minister.¹⁰

 

However, after years of reflection on the role of the sovereign in the event of a hung parliament, Vernon Bogdanor has come to believe that it would not pose any constitutional problems for the Queen. This is because he thinks the fundamental convention of parliamentary government—that government must retain the confidence of the House of Commons—would remain unaltered by hung parliament. There is no reason why negotiations between the political leaders should involve the sovereign. Even if the sovereign was involved, she would remain a facilitator, not a negotiator. Bogdanor asserts that hung parliaments serve to expose the fundamental, yet rarely discussed, principle of parliamentary government: that a government depends upon the confidence of Parliament.

 

 

Lessons from outside of Westminster

HUNG parliaments have not been uncommon in parliamentary democracies overseas, including in other Westminster-style systems. The experiences of the devolved institutions of Wales and Scotland, as well as Canada are instructive. In these contexts, hung parliaments have produced surprisingly stable governments with few of the dire consequences usually suggested.

 

WALES

Since the Welsh Assembly's establishment in 1999, both minority administrations and coalitions—some very unlikely—have been more common than single-party majority administrations. The proportional electoral system in Cardiff—the Additional Member System (AMS)—is much more likely to deliver coalition or minority governments than Westminster's First Past the Post system. Coalition governments have proved to be more workable and stable than minority administrations (or majority administrations founded on a tiny majority). However, political parties in Wales have been reluctant to form a coalition; negotiations to form one, following the 2007 election, took over two months. To everyone's surprise, they resulted in the least likely of combinations: Labour–Plaid Cymru.

 

Roseanne Palmer, Stephen Thornton and Mark Crowley conclude that the clear message from Wales is that political parties in the UK can adapt to a system where single-party majority government is the exception rather than the rule; if push comes to shove, all parties have demonstrated a willingness to cooperate in forming coalition government. However, while party elites are gradually adapting to multi-party government, everyone else—including party members, the public and the media—is ‘still trying to play the game according to the old Westminster rules’.

 

SCOTLAND

Like the Welsh Assembly, the Scottish Parliament has predominantly had coalition or minority government since its establishment in 1999, again due to its use of the AMS form of voting. Indeed, it was designed to do just this in order to forge a more consensual ‘new politics’. For the Parliament's first eight years, Labour and the Liberal Democrats governed as a coalition. James Mitchell suggests that the experience was not all that different from majority government. Parties remained cohesive and mostly obeyed the whips.

 

From May 2007 onwards, however, the Scottish National Party (SNP) has governed as a minority government with support from the Green Party that does not quite amount to a traditional confidence and supply agreement. Mitchell feels that the new minority government has the potential to significantly alter Scottish politics. The old distinction between being in and out of power is blurred with minority government, and all parties, if they play their cards well, can influence the public policy agenda. Mitchell concludes that the experience of the Scottish Parliament demonstrates that ‘new institutions alone do not result in new cultures.’ However, as in Wales, the parties themselves do not seem to have quite grasped this.

 

CANADA

The Canadian Parliament is modelled on Westminster and uses the First Past the Post system of voting. However, hung parliaments—known as minority parliaments—are more common than in the UK and are becoming more frequent. As in the UK, coalitions are not a regular feature of minority governments in Canada, and the governing party usually works with the smaller opposition parties on an ad hoc basis. Although minority parliaments tend to be shorter-lived than their majority counterparts, David Docherty insists that they are far from the ‘legislative eunuchs’, as some portray them. For example, Lester Pearson, a prime minister responsible for some of the most important policy innovations in the twentieth century, never governed with a majority. Docherty goes so far as to claim that minority governments are often a ‘more sensitive and responsive form of government’.

 

He argues that the Canadian experience has shown that minority governments can be very successful, but this is more likely when they govern as a minority, not as a majority. They must be willing to negotiate with other parties, and Docherty notes that moderate parties are usually more willing to do this. He also observes that minority governments which replace long sitting governments are more likely to have a shorter life span than minority governments which were formerly majority governments. Finally, he recommends that traditional notions of confidence be relaxed in the event of a hung parliament to facilitate a more consensual style of politics.
 

 

The impact of a hung parliament at Westminster

IT might be expected that an unclear election result would cause immediate difficulties in Parliament. How might it affect parliamentary procedures and business, as well as the role of MPs and peers?

 

PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURES

Alex Brazier maintains that a hung parliament would not disrupt the functioning of Parliament as its established procedure, he writes, is ‘well-equipped to deal with such a contingency’ and indeed has done so in the past. How the House of Commons worked on those occasions provides some indication of what might happen in a hung parliament of the future.

 

Experience has shown that a hung parliament need not necessarily delay the start of the parliamentary session. The parliamentary machinery is set up to run automatically for the first few weeks. The House will meet on the day set by the previous government in the election proclamation, and its first task it to elect a Speaker. The choice of Speaker would proceed separately from any discussions about forming a government. Brazier notes that recent procedural change has formalised the convention that if the previous Speaker has not retired but is returned—standing in the constituency as a Speaker without partisan opposition—he or she should be re-elected. However, he concedes that a hung parliament may place some pressure on the role of the Speaker, making it more likely that his or her casting vote will have to be exercised.

 

Furthermore, unlike in Scotland and Wales, there is no fixed date by which the executive must be appointed, nor is a vote required to secure the appointment. The first vote that a new government would need to win would occur at the end of the debate on the Queen's Speech, which may take place as long as a month after the election. The loss of any of the votes at the end of the debate would have the same effect as a no confidence motion and would force the government to resign. Assuming the government wins this crucial and potentially perilous vote, it would not be expected to face a major challenge in the House for a month or two. Alex Brazier asserts that its survival would be largely dependant on the attitude of the opposition and whether it wants to defeat the government and thus cause another general election.

 

IMPACT ON THE COMMONS

A hung parliament would certainly shake up the operation of the House of Commons, where the Labour Party has had a strong majority for over a decade. A number of contributors to No Overall Control? highlight the inexperience of most MPs with minority governments; nearly two-thirds of current MPs were elected in 1997 or later and have no experience of a government without a strong majority or even of another party in power.

 

Alex Brazier maintains that a hung parliament would greatly affect MPs, for they would be required to be present at many more votes. It would also give them more opportunities to extract concessions from the government. However, he predicts that they would continue to spend a great deal of their time on constituency matters, which would be largely unaffected by a hung parliament.

 

Philip Cowley considers what effect a hung parliament might have on backbench MPs. He argues that behaviour would be largely dependant on their political party. If Labour was the largest party in a minority administration or coalition, MPs would behave very differently than if the Conservatives were. Labour MPs are no more likely to rebel against the whip than their Conservative counterparts, but first-term governments tend to be more disciplined for a variety of reasons. The Labour Party has been the governing party for over a decade, and the rate of backbench rebellion has increased over time. Moreover, in the past, Labour MPs have tended to rebel more frequently when the party has been in minority status.

 

Cowley suggests that the behaviour of the Liberal Democrats in the event of a hung parliament would be much harder to predict. However, they would play a crucial role as the swing voters in any hung parliament, much as they do now in the House of Lords. While the Liberal Democrats have traditionally been assumed to be closer to Labour, they are currently three times more likely to vote with the Conservatives than Labour.

 

IMPACT ON THE LORDS

Since the removal of most hereditary peers in 1999, no single party has been able to command a majority in the House of Lords, making it difficult for the government to predict whether and when it will get its business through. Government defeats in the Lords since then have been more frequent, with 64 defeats in the 2003–2004 session compared with 31 in the 1998–1999 session.¹¹ Russell and Sciara have argued that the Commons and the Lords are also increasingly acting in partnership to achieve legislative change.¹² For example, in 2006, MPs backed a Lords amendment to the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill and defeated the government in the House of Commons, and the two Houses similarly collaborated to defeat the government on the Identity Cards and Police and Justice Bills.¹³

 

Both Brazier and Cowley suggest that a hung parliament might serve to weaken the Lords' ability to defeat the government if it resulted in a coalition government. This could have the effect of delivering safer and larger majorities in the Lords, paradoxically delivering more control over government business than has been the case since 1999. Indeed, it is possible that legislation might make its way through Parliament more smoothly under a coalition government than a majority government.
 

 

Would the public notice?

IT has been declared by some that a hung parliament would revitalise public interest in politics. But what, if anything, do we know about the public's view? Mark Gill finds that there has been little research into public understanding of, or attitudes towards, a hung parliament. The data that does exist reveals a lack of public consensus about what type of government is most preferable: majority, minority or coalition. In surveys conducted in 1991 and 1995, twice as many people strongly favoured one party in government rather than two or more forming a coalition, but very few people exhibited a strong preference either way.

 

Moreover, the public often expresses seemingly contradictory views on the subject. On the one hand, polls have revealed that a single-party government is viewed as the most stable form of government; however, the public is also attracted to a coalition style government on the grounds that it would be more likely to serve a wider range of interests. Gill suggests these apparently opposing views actually reflect the usual competing demands of the public on government. People want stable and effective government—which they may feel may be more likely to be achieved by single-party rule—but they might also consider that a coalition government would be more likely to serve the broader national interest.

 

In any case, most people will have thought very little about the next general election, which is not expected to take place until 2009 or 2010, so it is difficult to speculate whether they would welcome or be wary of a hung parliament. However, their views will be largely shaped by media debates and commentaries. The Labour and Conservative Parties are likely to portray it as a recipe for weak government, though Gill suggests that the experience of Scotland and Wales may render this argument unconvincing. The Liberal Democrats may welcome the possibility of a hung parliament, but as both Simon Hughes and Austin Mitchell acknowledge, it is virtually impossible to campaign for a hung parliament. There is evidence that many voters, particularly Liberal Democrat supporters, would be prepared to vote for a party they don't normally support in order to help shape a particular national outcome.

 

Any election that produces a hung parliament would probably have a very high-voter turnout, since it is likely to be extremely competitive.¹⁴ However, voting alone does not necessarily engage people in politics. Moreover, levels of public interest in politics have remained extraordinarily stable over the past four decades, and distrust of politicians is ‘deeply entrenched in the British psyche’. Gill argues that the most plausible way in which a hung parliament could be a catalyst for improving the relationship between politics and the public is if it leads to a stable coalition government, presumably where the Liberal Democrats were the junior coalition partner to either Labour or the Conservatives.¹⁵ The coalition government could claim that it represented more than half the voting public, and possibly more than 60 per cent. However, it would inevitably raise expectations about a new era in politics which it may not be capable of delivering. The coalition would have to demonstrate that it was unified and addressed issues of national concern. As Gill notes, history suggests the most damaging indictment the public can make of a government—aside from patent fraud or incompetence—is that it is ‘divided and inward-looking’.

 

 

A catalyst for electoral reform?

It has often been asserted that a hung parliament would lead to the adoption of a more proportional system of voting, probably at the insistence of the Liberal Democrats. David Butler claims that two hung parliaments in a row would most certainly enhance the prospect of proportional representation (PR), and Austin Mitchell believes that a hung parliament may be the only catalyst for electoral change. However, is this really the case? None of the hung parliaments in the past led to such an outcome. Why is it more likely now?

 

Helen Margetts suggests that it is because the UK is already in a process of prolonged transition to PR due to the significant growth in the number of political parties operating in the UK political system. This increase has been fuelled by the adoption of more proportional electoral systems for the devolved institutions and the European Parliament.¹⁶ Citing the work of Colomer¹⁷, she notes that the higher the number of effective parties in operation, the greater the likelihood of the adoption of PR. Furthermore, there has been a significant rise in the measure of disproportionality at Westminster—'a mismatch between votes cast and seats awarded'—which is rendering it increasingly unstable.

 

Nonetheless, there has hardly been any public clamour for electoral reform; Mark Gill notes that public concern about constitutional issues is minimal.¹⁸ The two main parties have been extremely reluctant to call for change. Margetts contends that it would take a hung parliament—or at least the real prospect of one—for the two main parties to take serious steps towards change. She argues that the electoral fortunes of the Liberal Democrats—the ‘most viable coalition partner’ for either Labour or the Conservatives—would be ‘critical’. Moreover, decisions made by the Liberal Democrats in the event of a hung parliament could have a major impact on the future of electoral reform. Simon Hughes affirms that a ‘commitment to introduce and vote for legislation which would lead to a politically proportional Parliament’ would almost certainly be a prerequisite for Liberal Democrat support of either of the major parties.

 

 

Conclusion: unstable ‘nightmare’ or ‘great opportunity’?

The prospect of a hung parliament has a tendency to provoke diametrically opposing responses from political commentators. On the one hand, there are those who believe that a hung parliament would be disastrous, bringing uncertainty to a system which has been traditionally stable. On the other hand, a number of people have claimed that a hung parliament might revitalise interest in the political system in a time of marked public disenchantment in politics.

 

Minority governments in the UK have had a tendency to be short-lived. Vernon Bogdanor maintains that none over the past century have offered either stability or a clear policy direction. Citing the ‘chaotic’ Callaghan administration of 1976–1979, Simon Jenkins argues that a hung parliament would render government ‘indecisive and unstable’, as well as less democratic. It makes it more difficult for the electorate to vote a government out of office, and the effect is to give minority groups scope to influence policies over which they have no majority mandate. As Jenkins puts it, ‘the under-representation of winner-takes-all is replaced by the over-representation of loser-takes-some.’ Philip Norton agrees, highlighting in particular the ‘hand-to-mouth existence’ of previous minority governments and the disproportionate amount of power given to smaller parties. ‘When it comes to a hung parliament’, he writes, ‘the name says it all’.

 

Both Norton and Philip Cowley are sceptical of claims that a hung parliament would strengthen Parliament, with the latter stating that ‘there is nothing about a hung parliament that automatically enhances the power and vitality of the legislature against the executive’. Cowley speculates that it could actually do the reverse, particularly if there is a coalition rather than minority government.

 

However, Simon Hughes prefers to view hung parliaments as ‘balanced parliaments’. Pointing to the experience of other countries, he declares that neither strong nor good government is dependent on a single-party administration. Austin Mitchell agrees. Considering the Lib-Lab pact of the late 1970s, which resuscitated the minority Callaghan administration, he argues that it ‘sustained confidence in a difficult economic situation’.

 

Moreover, Hughes states that a ‘balanced parliament’ would better reflect the wishes of the electorate: ‘At last, the breadth of public opinion, which had shown no party majority support among the electorate, would have to be reflected in each and every decision of the House of Commons.’ Parliament would be strengthened because parliamentary votes would be less predictable and therefore crucial. Hughes views a hung parliament as a ‘great opportunity’ not as a threat, claiming that the uncertainty of the political situation may be an impetus for exciting change: ‘Some of the greatest periods of radical politics and political momentum’, he enthuses, ‘have occurred in a context like this.’

 

Regardless of whether hung parliaments are ‘good ’or ‘bad’ for democracy, their existence over a sustained period would certainly lead to a fundamental change in British politics: ‘the rules of the game’, writes David Butler, ‘would inevitably be transformed’. There is no doubt that, in Butler's words, ‘political voyeurs would have a wonderful time’. But would anyone else? It all depends on who you ask.

 

 

Notes

The No Overall Control project was funded by a grant from the Nuffield Foundation.

¹ Research Fellow, Parliament & Government Programme, Hansard Society. 

² The term ‘hung parliament’ derives from the American term ‘hung jury’ and was imported into British political discourse in the 1970s by The Economist newspaper. 

³ A. Brazier and S. Kalitowski (eds), No Overall Control?, Hansard Society, 2008. The contributors to the book are are: Alex Brazier, Vernon Bogdanor, David Butler, Philip Cowley, Mark Crowley, David Docherty, Mark Gill, Simon Hughes, Simon Jenkins, Susanna Kalitowski, Helen Margetts, Austin Mitchell, James Mitchell, Philip Norton, Roseanne Palmer and Stephen Thornton. 

⁴ There were also two instances where a government lost its majority in the House of Commons between general elections, in April 1977 and February 1997. In both cases, the resulting minority government remained in power until the next general election. 

⁵ Source: David Butler. 

⁶ Just over a quarter of the councils who participated in the 2007 local elections (85 out of 312) resulted in a No Overall Control administration. Source: BBC News. 

⁷ Source: David Butler, who derived the information from C. Rallings and M. Thrasher (2007), Media Guide to the New Parliamentary Constituencies, 5th ed., pp. 350–51. 

⁸ J. Rasmussen, ‘Constitutional Aspects of Government Formation in a Hung Parliament’, Parliamentary Affairs 40(2), 1987, pp. 139–53. 

⁹ Fabian Commission, The Future of the Monarchy, Fabian Society, 2003. 

¹⁰ See T. Hames and M. Leonard, Modernising the monarchy, Demos, 1998. The Institute for Public Policy Research made a similar recommendation in its 1991 report, The Constitution of the United Kingdom, Institute for Public Policy Research. 

¹¹ Joint Committee on Conventions, Conventions of the UK Parliament, HL Paper 265-I/HC 1212-I, 2005–2006, para 35. 

¹² M. Russell and M. Sciara, The House of Lords in 2006: Negotiating a Stronger Second Chamber, Constitution Unit, 2007. 

¹³ M. Russell and M. Sciara,'The Policy Impact of Defeats in the House of Lords', Paper presented to 2007 Political Association Conference, University of Bath, 2007. 

¹⁴ Gill notes that perceptions of competitiveness are one of the most important influences on turnout. There was a relatively high turnout in the close election of 1992 (77 per cent) and a historic low turnout in the Labour landslide in 2001 (59 per cent). 

¹⁵ However, the experience in Wales shows that a Conservative-Labour coalition is not out of the question. 

¹⁶ See P. Dunleavy and H. Margetts, ‘From Majoritarian to Pluralist Democracy? Electoral Reform in Britain since 1997’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 13(3), 2001, pp. 295–319. 

¹⁷ J.M. Colomer, ‘It's the Parties that Choose Electoral Systems (or Duverger's Laws Upside Down)’, Political Studies 53(1), 2005, pp. 1–21.

¹⁸ Since 1997, MORU has never found more than two per cent of the British public (and in most cases no more than one per cent) citing constitutional issues as one of the most important issues facing the country, even though the past decade has witnessed significant constitutional reform.